Iran Interlink.exposing Mojahedin Khalq,Rajavi cult,Massoud Rajavi, Maryam Rajavi

We are only half way through January and the EU terrorism list (from which the Mojahedin Khalq Organisation has been removed) has still not been announced but the MKO (aka the Rajavi cult, MEK, NCRI, NLA) has been unable to refrain from showing its true nature.

Iraq’s National Security Advisor has reported the arrest of an MKO member who is currently in custody after surrendering himself to an Iraqi security unit. The man, who is a resident of Camp Ashraf, was about to perform a suicide mission, but could not go through with it. According to a statement from the office of the National Security Advisor, the MKO member has claimed the MKO use severe torture and brainwashing on its members. He claims that: “I was sent with a clear and precise plan to perform a suicide mission in this Iraqi base”.
http://iran-interlink.org/?mod=view&id=5720

This news will come as no surprise to those who know the MKO. Looking at Massoud Rajavi’s track record over thirty years, nothing more or less than this could be expected. While he was able to send over 2,000 civilians their deaths back in 1988 in the failed Eternal Light operation, he has since then sent numerous smaller groups to perform suicidal terrorist attacks in Iran with the added instruction that if captured the person should use their cyanide pill to kill themselves. More recently, MKO were instructed to set fire to themselves to protest the arrest of Maryam Rajavi on terrorism charges in Paris. Two died and several others sustained serious injury with their permanent disfigurement and disability a direct result of Rajavi’s order.

Massoud Rajavi who owns the MKO also owns the blood of the members and will spill it whenever he needs to. In this case to rescue himself from the mess he has made in Iraq. The MKO members are his capital which buys him power. They are expandable assets which have been used and reused shamelessly by western agencies who have found this a useful and cheap resource in their ‘regime change’ armoury. It is clear that the neoconservatives and Zionists are using the MKO against the Iraqis, and are helping them by facilitating the impunity enjoyed by MKO leaders at the cult’s headquarters in Europe.

This latest fiasco in the Rajavi saga is surely the result of negligence and apathy of the European Union toward the MKO which apparently couldn’t summon the energy or interest to properly investigate the MKO and deal with it accordingly. A feat which has been assiduously performed by successive US Governments since 1994 and which has resulted in the MKO retaining its terrorism designation to date with the added information that the group is a cult. However, the Bush Administration has also proved itself to be overly greedy in wanting to have their cake and eat it. The US army has ‘protected’ this ‘terrorist’ outfit for five and a half years in Iraq in spite of repeated demands by the Iraqis for removal of this known FTO, which collaborated with the former regime, from Iraqi territory.

It is surely time for the international community as represented by the UNHCR and UNCHR to to help the Iraqis ensure that all the individuals held captive in Camp Ashraf are accorded their basic human rights. Rajavi's victims must be given the opportunity to renounce violence and to leave Camp Ashraf for third countries or to accept voluntary repatriation to Iran. Any delay in dismantling this notorious cult is to condemn the inhabitants to enforced membership of an illegal paramilitary terrorist group.

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Also read:
http://iran-interlink.org/?mod=view&id=5720

Mojahedin Khalq (MKO, MEK, Rajavi cult) Suicide operative arrested in Iraq

... The security forces of Iraq have arrested a member of Mojahedin Khalq Organisation (aka: MKO, MEK, PMOI, NCRI, Rajavi cult) after he failed to carry out his suicide mission inside an Iraqi security base...

Buratha News in Baghdad, January 19, 2009
http://burathanews.net/news_article_58139.html

The office of Mr. Movafagh Al Rabiee, Iraq’s National Security Advisor, has issued a statement.

The security forces of Iraq have arrested a member of Mojahedin Khalq Organisation (aka: MKO, MEK, PMOI, NCRI, Rajavi cult) after he failed to carry out his suicide mission inside an Iraqi security base.

According to the source this resident of Ashraf camp (MKO base) gave himself up and is now being kept in secure and safe conditions.

According to the statement this member of Mojahedin Khalq has now complained about the severe exercise of torture and brainwashing techniques employed by the heads of the organisation.

According to his written statements, he claims that: “I was sent with a clear and precise plan to perform a suicide mission in this Iraqi base”.

According to the statement of the office of Iraq’s National Security Advisor, “the aim of this suicide attack has been to put pressure on the security forces of Iraq, to entangle them in this because it is this new force that has taken over the security of Ashraf camp from January 01, 2009”

The statement says it is believed that this was to be used in the media in the Arab world as well as the western media by MKO and its supporters. It also has the aim of making the disaffected members inside the camp afraid of giving themselves up to the Iraqi forces.

The statement adds that every effort is being made to either repatriate him voluntarily or find another country to transfer him. The Iraqi government wishes to announce that while the government of Iraq is committed to all its international obligations, including any promises made to the United State administration, that: “the security forces of Iraq are aware and conscious of the fruitless activities of Mojahedin Khalq Organisation in creating disturbances in Iraqi society and have been briefed to be able to carry out their duties”.

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Also read:
http://iran-interlink.org/?mod=view&id=5692

Removal from EU Terrorism List

Mojahedin-e Khalq rewarded for cooperation against Iran?

By Massoud Khodabandeh, January 13, 2009

The State Department has again decided to keep the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO) with all its aliases on the US terrorism list. There are a growing number of people who are calling for the US to have done with the group once and for all. Commentators on several blogs and articles suggest the leaders be ‘tried in internationally approved courts and let the membership go home.’ But this ignores the heavy price that has been paid for the group both politically (Iran has constantly accused the US and Europe of double standards on terrorism for their palpable support for the MKO) and financially (one of the key indicators of the actual irrelevance of adding the MKO to western terrorism lists is the tens of millions of dollars, euros and pounds the group has been able to spend on legal challenges and propaganda to keep itself alive – money which must come from somewhere).

With MKO personnel permanently camped-out in most of Europe’s parliaments for the past two years it should come as no surprise that the group will be removed from Europe’s terrorism list when it is announced on January 15. In July 2008, the EU announced that there were “no grounds” to amend the list of terrorist organisations, which includes 48 groups, and EU officials insisted that the decision to keep the MEK on the list of the terrorist groups is not related to the Western efforts to persuade Iran to halt its nuclear enrichment program.

What is behind this peculiar change which will redefine the group as non-terrorist in Europe?

As with removal from the UK terrorism list in June 2008, no material difference will accrue to the MKO. In his book on the Mojahedin Dr. Ronen A. Cohen says the MKO “does not have the characteristics of a classic terror organization as it does not initiate terror against innocents” – although the indiscriminate nature of many of its attacks mean 12,000 civilians have been killed in MKO operations inside Iran over two decades.

The most pertinent explanation for why removal from the lists is irrelevant is because the MKO even at the height of its military prowess in 1988 and with the full backing of Saddam Hussein and the west was unable to fulfil its aim of replacing the Islamic Republic with its own rule. Massoud Raajvi’s long term premise that such change would come about as a result of a popular uprising has been pragmatically replaced in the past five years with the conviction that regime change would be imposed on Iran from external powers – the USA, Israel - and that the MKO could reap the benefit of being there as a viable alternative when that happened.

Of these two, perhaps the latter version is currently more possible and perhaps probable even with a new US Administration in place.

So, what use do the MKO’s backers envisage for the group?

The protection of a uniformed anti-Iran mercenary group in Camp Ashraf in Diyali province for five years has been intentional. The price paid has been too great to allow jettisoning the group now, both politically and financially. However, it is important to note that even if it is removed from the UK, EU and perhaps US terrorism lists, the MKO does not enjoy governmental recognition or legitimacy anywhere in the world. Nor does any country need to give the group legitimacy in order to make use of it.

Essentially the use of the MKO is, as Rajavi himself has used them, as perpetrators and victims of violence. The MKO’s talent is that they are trained to kill and be killed according to Rajavi’s order. That they will do this to fulfil a western agenda without needing western approval is the group’s unique selling point and is enough to justify not continuing to label them as terrorists.

There is no doubt that for many observers the removal of the MKO from the European list will clarify the European position toward terrorism. Public opinion in the Middle East has never regarded western terrorism lists as about terrorism per se but as lists of enemies of western interests.

Inclusion of the violently anti-Iranian MKO along with groups which are genuinely anti-western has been a major discrepancy of all the western terrorism lists, a glaring error of political judgement. The MKO may have begun life as an anti-imperialist group with armed struggle its core value, and continued this path under the patronage of Saddam Hussein. But, since its forced disarmament at the hands of the US army, the group has been able to beguile western powers, including Israel, into believing it shares common cause against Iran and is a friend and ally of at least some in the west.

After spending hundreds of millions of dollars on propaganda and legal fees to keep the MKO alive, these backers are now obliged to use this blunted tool in any way they can, perhaps to justify the expenditure, perhaps because they really believe the MKO can be an effective tool against Iran.

Anne Singleton, an expert on the MKO and author of ‘Saddam’s Private Army’ explains, “With a new Administration in the White House a pre-emptive strike on Iran looks unlikely. Instead the MKO’s backers have put together a coalition of small irritant groups, the known minority and separatist groups, along with the MKO. These groups will be garrisoned around the border with Iran and their task is to launch terrorist attacks into Iran over the next few years to keep the fire hot.

“The role of the MKO is to train and manage these groups using the expertise they acquired from Saddam’s Republican Guard. The price the MKO has had to pay is to accept their removal from their main base Camp Ashraf and relocate to other bases not their own. The inducement will be to remove the group from the terrorism list in Europe.”

Once the MKO has been declared in Europe as ‘no longer terrorists’, the group’s overt backers, Lord Corbett, Struan Stevenson MEP, Paulo Casaca MEP, and others who see the world, and in particular Iran, through neoconservative/Zionist tinted glasses will move to promote this coalition in their various circles.

Although it is tempting to cast this move into the sphere of betting both ways on the new Obama Administration’s Iran policy, the key trigger for this move has been the Iraqi government’s insistence on the removal of the MKO from Iraq and the handover of Camp Ashraf to Iraqi sovereignty. This has not been an unreasonable request of US forces over a five year period. However, it is only since the agreed handover of control of Camp Ashraf on January 1 that this became an inevitable outcome. For over a year, MKO backers in western parliaments have lobbied for the MKO to remain in Camp Ashraf on the grounds that the group would be massacred by vengeful Iraqis or forced back to Iran to face certain torture and execution. The falsity of this position has become exposed as the Iraqi government has continued to protect the group and has given repeated assurances that no one will be forced home against their will. Beyond this, the Iranian government’s own position on prosecuting leading members has made it impossible to send anyone back that Iran does not want.

The reason for the insistence on maintaining the MKO in Camp Ashraf – and now in new border based garrisons alongside other armed groups – has been because the only use for the group is to act as an irritant against Iran. If a full scale military attack could not be manufactured which would involve them, then small scale terrorist attacks are the next best alternative.

What all this overlooks, of course, is the human aspect of this group. For years former members of the MKO have warned of severe human rights violations perpetrated against the members. Human Rights Watch conducted its own investigation into the group’s recent history in 2005 and published a damning report titled No Exit. But more recently, those who escaped the camp since its capture by American forces in 2003 and who have managed to reach Europe, are alleging continued cruelties including unnecessary hysterectomies imposed on women to rob them of any hope of having children.

For five years the American army has effectively prevented any independent investigation into these allegations. The primary task of the Iraqi military now in charge of the camp must be to allow humanitarian agencies to access the camp’s residents and individually assess their mental, physical and emotional status. Anything less than this is to condemn 3,250 people to being part of an illegal paramilitary group without their active consent.

This still leaves the fundamental question of what the west will get from its investment in the MKO. It is looking likely that the US will cherry-pick whoever it wants from the MKO to perform in its new coalition strategy. The old, sick, disabled and disturbed will be left for the Iraqi government to deal with.

In view of western patronage of this group, albeit largely covert in nature since it does not acknowledge that it is the group’s willingness to die that is its main use, then it is western countries which ultimately have a responsibility, if not an outright duty, to rescue the group from Iraq. If the group’s membership is indeed moved to other bases in Iraq to continue involvement in acts of violence, then any blood shed will be on western hands not those who are defending their country’s security.

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Also read:
http://iran-interlink.org/?mod=view&id=5671

Mojahedin Khalq Organisation still designated a FTO in USA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 12, 2009

In the Matter of the Review of the Designation of Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK), and All Designated Aliases, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Upon Petition Filed Pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended

The MEK filed a petition for revocation of its designation as a foreign terrorist organization (the ``Petition''). Based upon a review of the Administrative Record assembled in this matter, including the Petition and associated filings by the MEK, pursuant to Section 219(a)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)(B)) (``INA''), and in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, I conclude that the circumstances that were the basis for the 2003 re-designation of the aforementioned organization as a foreign terrorist organization have not changed in such a manner as to
warrant revocation of the designation and that the national security of the United States does not warrant a revocation.

Therefore, I hereby determine that the designation of the aforementioned organization as a foreign terrorist organization, pursuant to Section 219 of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1189), shall be maintained.

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register.

Dated: January 7, 2009.

Condoleezza Rice,

Secretary of State, Department of State.

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Also read
http://iran-interlink.org/?mod=view&id=2309

State Department's Report on Mojahedin Khalq Orgainsation, Rajavi cult headed by Massoud Rajavi and Maryam Rajavi

US, State Department Office, May 2, 2007

As noted before, the new report of "Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism", published on April 30, has a more serous tone on the MKO than previous reports.

These additions, retrieved by comparing annual terrorism report 2006 and 2006, are as follows:

Additions to "Description":

- Pointing to the assassination of US military and civilian personnel in Iran during 1970s,

- Stressing the ability and the will of MKO members and leadership to conduct terrorist operations across the world,

- Introducing the MKO as one of the most violent political groups, established during 60s,

- Emphasizing the fact that MKO was disliked by Iranians, following the Islamic Revolution,

- Underlining the fact that for more than 3 decades, MKO used its bases in Iraq and Europe to conduct terror attacks against Iran,

- Expansion of financial base, military skills and leaders' activities in Europe.

- Showing cult-like characteristics, in addition to terrorist ones,

- Ideological pressure on members and offering them distorted history of Iran,

- Stressing the existence of compulsory divorces, cleansing sessions and separation of kids from their parents,

- Establishing cult-of-personality around Rajavi.

Additions to "Activities":

- Confessing that despite US efforts, MKO members and leaders have never been taken to court for their role in illegal activities,

- MKO has been supported by reprehensible regimes, like that of Saddam Hussein.

- Stressing that MKO conducted terrorist operations from its bases in France for 5 years,

- Citing reports that showed Maryam Rajavi encouraged members to "crush Kurds under the tanks",

- That 7 Iranians had been arrested by FBI for transferring 400000 dollars to the MKO for buying weapons,

- Voluntarily surrender to coalition, after the ouster of Saddam, and submitting heavy weaponries,

- Arrest of 160 MKO members, including Maryam Rajavi, in France for using its bases in France for planning and financing terrorist operations,

- Self-immolations by MKO members, following the detention of Maryam Rajavi,

- Maryam Rajavi's going to hiding, and using video-satellite to motivate members,

- Discovering documents that prove MKO received the money of oil-for-food program and used the money for terrorist attacks,

- Citing documents that prove MKO-Saddam ties: lists, a film showing Saddam when he gives a suitcase of money to MKO's known leaders, and a footage of MKO members being trained by Iraqi army.

Additions to "Strength":

- Settlement of MKO supporters and members across Europe,

- Stressing the fact that "protected status" (4th Geneva Convention) doesn't apply to MKO members outside Camp Ashraf or to the group as a foreign terrorist organization,

- The fact that several MKO members, trained by former Iraqi regime to make bomb and work with weapons, are still at large.

Additions to "Location/Area of Operation":

- Maintaining bases in Paris,

- Targeting Iranian elements across the world,

- Active propaganda and lobby of NCRI in the West,

- NCRI's developed media strategies

Additions to "External Aid":

More reliance, after the fall of Saddam, on financial aids, collected under the name of unreal groups.

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Mojahedin remains on US terror list

US, State Department Office, May 2, 2007

The State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism on April 30 released the list of designated terrorist organizations. Once again Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) continues to occupy the status it has been designated since 1997.

MEK is also active under a variety of other pseudonyms known as MKO; Mujahedin-e Khalq; Muslim Iranian Students' Society; National Council of Resistance; National Council of Resistance (NCR); Organization of the People's Holy Warriors of Iran; The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA); The People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI); National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran.

Although the designation is not new, but a reference to its activities contributes to the EU decisiveness to keep it on its terror list. One of the reasons contradicting MEK’s claim of renouncing terrorist activities since June 2001 is well defined by the State Department’s explanation of the group’s activities:

"In 2003, French authorities arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks. Upon the arrest of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi, MEK members took to Paris' streets and engaged in self-immolation. French authorities eventually released Rajavi." [Rajavi was released on bail and is currently awaiting trial on terrorism charges.]

The report reads:
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm

.
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
a.k.a. MKO; Mujahedin-e Khalq; Muslim Iranian Students' Society; National Council of Resistance; National Council of Resistance (NCR); Organization of the People's Holy Warriors of Iran; The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA); The People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI); National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran

Description
The MEK advocates the violent overthrow of the Iranian regime and was responsible for the assassination of several U.S. military personnel and civilians in the 1970's. MEK leadership and members across the world maintain the capacity and will to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United State, Canada, and beyond.

The MEK emerged in the 1960s as one of the more violent political movements opposed to the Pahlavi dynasty and its close relationship with the United States. MEK ideology has gone through several iterations and blends elements of Marxism, Islam, and feminism. Following its participation in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the group rapidly fell out of favor with the Iranian people. The new Iranian government under Supreme Leader Khomeini systematically arrested and targeted many MEK members, causing most MEK leadership to flee to Europe. In 1986, MEK leaders and operatives were evicted from France and provided a safe haven in Iraq by Saddam Hussein. The group has planned and executed terrorist operations against the Iranian regime for nearly three decades from its European and Iraqi bases of operations. Additionally, it has expanded its fundraising base, further developed its paramilitary skills, and aggressively worked to expand its European ranks. In addition to its terrorist credentials, the MEK has also displayed cult-like characteristics. Upon entry into the group, new members are indoctrinated in MEK ideology and revisionist Iranian history. Members are also required to undertake a vow of "eternal divorce" and participate in weekly "ideological cleansings." Additionally, children are reportedly separated from parents at a young age. MEK leader Maryam Rajavi has established a "cult of personality." She claims to emulate the Prophet Muhammad and is viewed by members as the "Iranian President in exile."

Activities
The group's worldwide campaign against the Iranian government uses propaganda and terrorism to achieve its objectives and has been supported by reprehensible regimes, including that of Saddam Hussein. During the 1970s, the MEK assassinated several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the violent takeover in 1979 of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Despite U.S. efforts, MEK members have never been brought to justice for the group's role in these illegal acts.

In 1981, MEK leadership attempted to overthrow the newly installed Islamic regime; Iranian security forces subsequently initiated a crackdown on the group. The MEK instigated a bombing campaign, including an attack against the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Prime Minister's office, which killed some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. These attacks resulted in a popular uprising against the MEK and an expanded Iranian government crackdown which forced MEK leaders to flee to France. For five years, the MEK continued to wage its terrorist campaign from its Paris headquarters. Expelled by France in 1986, MEK leaders turned to Saddam Hussein's regime for basing, financial support, and training. Near the end of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad armed the MEK with heavy military equipment and deployed thousands of MEK fighters in suicidal, mass wave attacks against Iranian forces.

The MEK's relationship with the former Iraqi regime continued through the 1990s. In 1991, the group reportedly assisted in the Iraqi Republican Guard's bloody crackdown on Iraqi Shia and Kurds who rose up against Saddam Hussein's regime; press reports cite MEK leader Maryam Rajavi encouraging MEK members to "take the Kurds under your tanks." In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group's ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key Iranian military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, Brigadier General Ali Sayyaad Shirazi.

In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran's interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during "Operation Great Bahman" in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One of those attacks included a mortar attack against a major Iranian leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved in regular mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids against Iranian military and law enforcement personnel, as well as government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border. Also in 2001, the FBI arrested seven Iranians in the United States who funneled $400,000 to an MEK-affiliated organization in the UAE which used the funds to purchase weapons. Following an initial Coalition bombardment of the MEK's facilities in Iraq at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK leadership negotiated a cease-fire with Coalition Forces and voluntarily surrendered their heavy-arms to Coalition control. Since 2003, roughly 3,400 MEK members have been encamped at Ashraf in Iraq, under the supervision of Coalition Forces.

In 2003, French authorities arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks. Upon the arrest of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi, MEK members took to Paris' streets and engaged in self-immolation. French authorities eventually released Rajavi. Although currently in hiding, Rajavi has made appearances via video-satellite to "motivate" MEK-sponsored conferences across the globe.

According to evidence which became available after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK received millions of dollars in Oil-for-Food program subsidies from Saddam Hussein from 1999 through 2003, which supported planning and executing future terrorist attacks. In addition to discovering 13 lists of recipients of such vouchers on which the MEK appeared, evidence linking the MEK to the former Iraqi regime includes lists, as well as video footage of Saddam Hussein handing over suitcases of money to known MEK leaders, and video of MEK operatives receiving training from the Iraqi military.

Strength
Estimates place MEK's worldwide membership in the several thousands, with large pockets in Paris and other major European capitals. In Iraq, roughly 3,400 MEK members are gathered under Coalition supervision at Camp Ashraf, the MEK's main compound north of Baghdad, where they have been designated as "protected persons" under Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This status does not affect the group's members outside of Camp Ashraf or the MEK's designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. As a condition of the 2003 cease-fire agreement, the MEK relinquished more than 2,000 tanks; armored personnel carriers; and heavy artillery. A significant number of MEK personnel have voluntarily left Ashraf, and an additional several hundred MEK defectors have been voluntarily repatriated to Iran. Many MEK leaders and operatives, however, remain at large, and the number of at-large MEK operatives who received weapons and bomb-making instruction from Saddam Hussein's regime remains a source of significant concern.

Location/Area of Operation
In the 1980s, the MEK's leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. Following France's recognition of the Iranian regime in 1986, the group's leadership was forced out of France and took up residence in Iraq. The MEK maintains its main headquarters in Paris and has concentrations of members across Europe, in addition to the large concentration of MEK located at Camp Ashraf in Iraq. The MEK's global support structure remains in place with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North America. Operations target Iranian regime elements across the globe, including in Europe and Iran. MEK's political arm, the NCRI, has a global support network with active lobbying and propaganda efforts in major Western capitals. NCRI also has a well-developed media communications strategy.

External Aid
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003; the MEK received all of its military assistance and most of its financial support from Saddam Hussein. The fall of Saddam's regime has led MEK to increasingly rely on front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.

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According to the US policy in "war on terror", it has released an annual report on FTOs (Foreign Terrorist Organizations) since 1995.

The above –mentioned was a part of the 2007 report published on April 30^th, 2007.

Below you can consider the stand of US towards terrorist Organizations including MKO (Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization) and its front Organizations during 10 past years:

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996Report/1996index.html

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/1997index.html

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/1998index.html

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/1999index.html

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/fto_1999.html

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2001/

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2002/

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003/

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/c14818.htm

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/

****

In 1994 DOS released a completely documented report on MKO's activities and background; a part of which you can view here:

US State Department Report in 1994

(Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, by Kenneth Katzman. Washington, Nov 1992. 6 p.

Doc. call no.: M-U 42953-1 no.92-824F)

Announcement of US about Mojahedin

United States Department of State Washington,

D.C 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

DECL: OADR

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with section 523 of the FY 1994-95 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Public Law No. 103-236, I am pleased to submit on behalf of the secretary of state the report, "people's Mojahedin of Iran." The Administration has welcomed the opportunity to conduct a comprehensive review of the people's Mojahedin of Iran. The U.S, Government has been monitoring the group's activities since the 1970s. We believe the report to be a balanced and comprehensive analysis.

Consideration of this issue suggests it may be appropriate to take this opportunity to restate the Administration's policy towards the government of Iran. We want to be clear that our conclusions about the Mojahedin do not in any way imply support for the behavior of the current regime in Iran. As you are aware, longstanding U.S policy on Iran has been based on an unvarying premise: Iran should not enjoy the benefits of normal, state-to-state relation with other countries so long as it acts in ways that fall outside generally understood patterns of acceptable government behavior.

The Honorable Lee H. Hammilton, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.

UNCLASSIFIED

Our record of objection to outlaw Iranian behavior is clear. We vigorously oppose Iran's support for terrorism, its efforts to block the Middle East peace process through violence, its attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and its dismal human rights record. Until Iran alters its behavior in these critical areas, we will continue to lead the world in pressuring Tehran. We must convince the regime that there is a price to be paid for flouting international standards.We welcome the opportunity to brief the Congress on all aspects of our bilateral relations with Iran. You can be assured we will continue to monitor the activities of the Mojahedin. We remain, however, guided by the premise that our mutual distaste for the behavior of the regime in Tehran should not influence our analysis of the Mojahedin.

Sincerely,

Wendy R. Shermen Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

Report on the People's Mojahedin of Iran

UNCLASSIFIED

PEOPLE'S MOJAHEDIN OF IRAN

UNCLASSIFIED DECL: OADK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

HISTORY

CURRENT ACTIVITIES

STRUCTURE

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

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full report:

US State Department’s stand on Rajavi’s cult
1994 to 2007

Three Criteria for Designation

1. The organization must be foreign.

2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity as defined in Section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (See attachment for text.(

3. The organization's activities must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

US State Department Terrorism Report 2007

Chapter 6 -- Terrorist Organizations

Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) aliases cited are consistent with and drawn from the Specially Designated Nationals list maintained by the Department of Treasury. The full list can be found at the following website: http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/sdnlist.txt

Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism

April 30, 2007

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG(

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

Ansar al-Sunna (AS(

Armed Islamic Group (GIA (

Asbat al-Ansar

Aum Shinrikyo (Aum(

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA(

Communist Party of Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA(

Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA(

Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG(

HAMAS

Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM(

Hizballah

Islamic Jihad Union (IJU(

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU(

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM(

Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI(

Al-Jihad (AJ(

Kahane Chai (Kach(

Kongra-Gel (KGK/PKK(

Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT(

Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ(

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE(

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG(

Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM(

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK(

National Liberation Army (ELN(

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF(

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ(

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP(

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC (

Al-Qaida (AQ(

Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI(

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) [Formerly Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC(]

Real IRA (RIRA (

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC(

Revolutionary Nuclei (RN (

Revolutionary Organization 17 November

Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C (

Shining Path (SL(

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC (

…

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK(
a.k.a. MKO; Mujahedin-e Khalq; Muslim Iranian Students' Society; National Council of Resistance; National Council of Resistance (NCR); Organization of the People's Holy Warriors of Iran; The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA); The People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI); National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran

Description
The MEK advocates the violent overthrow of the Iranian regime and was responsible for the assassination of several U.S. military personnel and civilians in the 1970's. MEK leadership and members across the world maintain the capacity and will to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United State, Canada, and beyond.

The MEK emerged in the 1960s as one of the more violent political movements opposed to the Pahlavi dynasty and its close relationship with the United States. MEK ideology has gone through several iterations and blends elements of Marxism, Islam, and feminism. Following its participation in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the group rapidly fell out of favor with the Iranian people. The new Iranian government under Supreme Leader Khomeini systematically arrested and targeted many MEK members, causing most MEK leadership to flee to Europe. In 1986, MEK leaders and operatives were evicted from France and provided a safe haven in Iraq by Saddam Hussein. The group has planned and executed terrorist operations against the Iranian regime for nearly three decades from its European and Iraqi bases of operations. Additionally, it has expanded its fundraising base, further developed its paramilitary skills, and aggressively worked to expand its European ranks. In addition to its terrorist credentials, the MEK has also displayed cult-like characteristics. Upon entry into the group, new members are indoctrinated in MEK ideology and revisionist Iranian history. Members are also required to undertake a vow of "eternal divorce" and participate in weekly "ideological cleansings." Additionally, children are reportedly separated from parents at a young age. MEK leader Maryam Rajavi has established a "cult of personality." She claims to emulate the Prophet Muhammad and is viewed by members as the "Iranian President in exile."

Activities
The group's worldwide campaign against the Iranian government uses propaganda and terrorism to achieve its objectives and has been supported by reprehensible regimes, including that of Saddam Hussein. During the 1970s, the MEK assassinated several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the violent takeover in 1979 of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Despite U.S. efforts, MEK members have never been brought to justice for the group's role in these illegal acts.

In 1981, MEK leadership attempted to overthrow the newly installed Islamic regime; Iranian security forces subsequently initiated a crackdown on the group. The MEK instigated a bombing campaign, including an attack against the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Prime Minister's office, which killed some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. These attacks resulted in a popular uprising against the MEK and an expanded Iranian government crackdown which forced MEK leaders to flee to France. For five years, the MEK continued to wage its terrorist campaign from its Paris headquarters. Expelled by France in 1986, MEK leaders turned to Saddam Hussein's regime for basing, financial support, and training. Near the end of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad armed the MEK with heavy military equipment and deployed thousands of MEK fighters in suicidal, mass wave attacks against Iranian forces.

The MEK's relationship with the former Iraqi regime continued through the 1990s. In 1991, the group reportedly assisted in the Iraqi Republican Guard's bloody crackdown on Iraqi Shia and Kurds who rose up against Saddam Hussein's regime; press reports cite MEK leader Maryam Rajavi encouraging MEK members to "take the Kurds under your tanks." In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group's ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key Iranian military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, Brigadier General Ali Sayyaad Shirazi.

In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran's interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during "Operation Great Bahman" in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One of those attacks included a mortar attack against a major Iranian leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved in regular mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids against Iranian military and law enforcement personnel, as well as government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border. Also in 2001, the FBI arrested seven Iranians in the United States who funneled $400,000 to an MEK-affiliated organization in the UAE which used the funds to purchase weapons. Following an initial Coalition bombardment of the MEK's facilities in Iraq at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK leadership negotiated a cease-fire with Coalition Forces and voluntarily surrendered their heavy-arms to Coalition control. Since 2003, roughly 3,400 MEK members have been encamped at Ashraf in Iraq, under the supervision of Coalition Forces.

In 2003, French authorities arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks. Upon the arrest of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi, MEK members took to Paris' streets and engaged in self-immolation. French authorities eventually released Rajavi. Although currently in hiding, Rajavi has made appearances via video-satellite to "motivate" MEK-sponsored conferences across the globe.

According to evidence which became available after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK received millions of dollars in Oil-for-Food program subsidies from Saddam Hussein from 1999 through 2003, which supported planning and executing future terrorist attacks. In addition to discovering 13 lists of recipients of such vouchers on which the MEK appeared, evidence linking the MEK to the former Iraqi regime includes lists, as well as video footage of Saddam Hussein handing over suitcases of money to known MEK leaders, and video of MEK operatives receiving training from the Iraqi military.

Strength
Estimates place MEK's worldwide membership in the several thousands, with large pockets in Paris and other major European capitals. In Iraq, roughly 3,400 MEK members are gathered under Coalition supervision at Camp Ashraf, the MEK's main compound north of Baghdad, where they have been designated as "protected persons" under Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This status does not affect the group's members outside of Camp Ashraf or the MEK's designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. As a condition of the 2003 cease-fire agreement, the MEK relinquished more than 2,000 tanks; armored personnel carriers; and heavy artillery. A significant number of MEK personnel have voluntarily left Ashraf, and an additional several hundred MEK defectors have been voluntarily repatriated to Iran. Many MEK leaders and operatives, however, remain at large, and the number of at-large MEK operatives who received weapons and bomb-making instruction from Saddam Hussein's regime remains a source of significant concern.

Location/Area of Operation
In the 1980s, the MEK's leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. Following France's recognition of the Iranian regime in 1986, the group's leadership was forced out of France and took up residence in Iraq. The MEK maintains its main headquarters in Paris and has concentrations of members across Europe, in addition to the large concentration of MEK located at Camp Ashraf in Iraq. The MEK's global support structure remains in place with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North America. Operations target Iranian regime elements across the globe, including in Europe and Iran. MEK's political arm, the NCRI, has a global support network with active lobbying and propaganda efforts in major Western capitals. NCRI also has a well-developed media communications strategy.

External Aid
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003; the MEK received all of its military assistance and most of its financial support from Saddam Hussein. The fall of Saddam's regime has led MEK to increasingly rely on front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian

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According to the US policy in "war on terror", it has released an annual report on FTOs (Foreign Terrorist Organizations) since 1995.
The above –mentioned was a part of the 2007 report published on April 30th, 2007.

Below you can consider the stand of US towards terrorist Organizations including MKO (Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization) and its front Organizations during 10 past years:

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996Report/1996index.html

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/1997index.html

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/1998index.html

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/1999index.html

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/fto_1999.html

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2001/

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2002/

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003/

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/c14818.htm

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/

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In 1994 DOS released a completely documented report on MKO's activities and background; a part of which you can view here:

(To view the complete report of US State Department in 1994 click here)

US State Department Report in 1994

(Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, by Kenneth Katzman. Washington, Nov 1992. 6 p.

Doc. call no.: M-U 42953-1 no.92-824F)

Announcement of US about Mojahedin
United States Department of State Washington,

D.C 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

DECL: OADR

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with section 523 of the FY 1994-95 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Public Law No. 103-236, I am pleased to submit on behalf of the secretary of state the report, "people's Mojahedin of Iran." The Administration has welcomed the opportunity to conduct a comprehensive review of the people's Mojahedin of Iran. The U.S, Government has been monitoring the group's activities since the 1970s. We believe the report to be a balanced and comprehensive analysis.

Consideration of this issue suggests it may be appropriate to take this opportunity to restate the Administration's policy towards the government of Iran. We want to be clear that our conclusions about the Mojahedin do not in any way imply support for the behavior of the current regime in Iran. As you are aware, longstanding U.S policy on Iran has been based on an unvarying premise: Iran should not enjoy the benefits of normal, state-to-state relation with other countries so long as it acts in ways that fall outside generally understood patterns of acceptable government behavior.

The Honorable Lee H. Hammilton, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.

UNCLASSIFIED

Our record of objection to outlaw Iranian behavior is clear. We vigorously oppose Iran's support for terrorism, its efforts to block the Middle East peace process through violence, its attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and its dismal human rights record. Until Iran alters its behavior in these critical areas, we will continue to lead the world in pressuring Tehran. We must convince the regime that there is a price to be paid for flouting international standards.We welcome the opportunity to brief the Congress on all aspects of our bilateral relations with Iran. You can be assured we will continue to monitor the activities of the Mojahedin. We remain, however, guided by the premise that our mutual distaste for the behavior of the regime in Tehran should not influence our analysis of the Mojahedin.

Sincerely,

Wendy R. Shermen Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:
Report on the People's Mojahedin of Iran

UNCLASSIFIED
PEOPLE'S MOJAHEDIN OF IRAN

UNCLASSIFIED DECL: OADK
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
HISTORY
CURRENT ACTIVITIES
STRUCTURE
EXTERNAL SUPPORT

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Date: 2009-01-20