Abu Mazen plays losing hand badly in Gaza Strip

Abu Mazen plays losing hand badly in Gaza Strip

Mahmoud Abbas Maryarm RajaviAlmonitor, July 17 2017:… Meanwhile, as Fatah-Egypt relations were hitting a new low, the Palestinian Authority sent a parliamentary delegation to take part in a conference organized by the People’s Mujahedeen Organization of Iran (Mujahedeen-e-Khalq), perhaps as a sop to Saudi Arabia, upon which Abbas depends for support. Ahmad Melhem writes, “In light of the PA’s adherence to Saudi positions on most of the … 

محمود عباس مریم رجوی مزدوران سابق صدام وم امروز سعدیMahmoud Abbas not representative of Palestinians

Link to the source

Abu Mazen plays losing hand badly in Gaza Strip

Fatah-Egypt at “bone-breaking stage”

Adnan Abu Amer writes that “the relationship between Fatah and Egypt has reached the bone-breaking stage, especially with [Palestinian President Mahmoud] Abbas as head of the movement.”

Abbas has played a weak hand as badly as one could imagine it being played. His plan to pressure Hamas by cutting both staff salaries and electricity in the Gaza Strip has earned him the wrath of the people there. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi rejected Abbas’ plan, contributing to a downward spiral in Fatah’s ties with Cairo. 

Adding insult to injury, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) choreographed a deal between Hamas and Mohammed Dahlan, Fatah’s former head in Gaza and Abbas’ bitter rival, to provide badly needed fuel during the Eid al-Fitr holiday last month.

Dahlan, who comes from the Khan Yunis refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, was once a blood enemy of Hamas. In addition to street battles with Hamas while with Fatah, Dahlan was implicated in an American plot to overthrow the elected Hamas government in 2006. Dahlan was forced into exile in the UAE in 2012 after Abbas accused him of corruption, for which Dahlan was tried in absentia, and complicity in the murder of PLO leader Yasser Arafat. Dahlan relocated to the UAE where he became an adviser to Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and deputy supreme commander of the UAE armed forces.

Shlomi Eldar explains that Samir al-Mashharawi, Dahlan’s right-hand man, who has recently returned to Gaza, had provided refuge to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in 2004 to evade Israeli attack helicopters, forging an unusual personal bond.

Al-Monitor has covered how Hamas has been on defense since the US-Saudi-Islamic summit in May, when it was lumped with Hezbollah, the Islamic State and al-Qaeda on the list of deplorables. These developments led Hamas to consider better ties with Iran and Russia. Like Abbas, Hamas holds a weak hand, but seems to be playing it better. Hamas has so far outmaneuvered Abbas in relations with Egypt and the UAE, and by leveraging Dahlan. 

Of course, Dahlan’s return, if it happens, would hardly be a win for Hamas. If Hamas allows him to return, Dahlan would be little more than a Trojan horse, giving Cairo and Abu Dhabi the foothold they have desired to eventually unseat the Islamic Resistance Movement, which both countries associate with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Meanwhile, as Fatah-Egypt relations were hitting a new low, the Palestinian Authority sent a parliamentary delegation to take part in a conference organized by the People’s Mujahedeen Organization of Iran (Mujahedeen-e-Khalq), perhaps as a sop to Saudi Arabia, upon which Abbas depends for support.

Ahmad Melhem writes, “In light of the PA’s adherence to Saudi positions on most of the region’s issues and the political and financial support it receives from Riyadh on the one hand and the support Iran provides to resistance factions, especially Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the other, the relations between Iran and the PA continue to deteriorate, with no sign of the slightest improvement.”

Qatar and Iraq

Mustafa Saadoun reports that Qatar, which is seeking improved relations with Iraq, continues to host family members and loyalists of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, as well as other prominent Sunni Iraqi opposition politicians.

“Among the most prominent figures hosted by Qatar are the wife of the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Sajida Khairallah Talfah; the last foreign minister in Saddam’s regime, Naji Sabri al-Hadithi; and Saddam’s longtime aide [and Saddam’s brother in law] Arshad Yassin,” writes Saadoun.

He continues, “There are also other Iraqi figures in Qatar, such as Abdul Hakim al-Saadi, brother of Abdul Malik al-Saadi, who is considered the most prominent Sunni cleric in Iraq; Tariq al-Hashemi, the former vice president whom Iraq convicted of terrorism; and other academic and military oppositionists.”

Saadoun explains that Qatar is unlikely to deport or hand over any of their Iraqi guests, which provide Doha with leverage on Iraq as well as other Gulf countries.

“Qatar probably doesn’t want to take the same step the Iraqi government took when it deported members of the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq of Iran and gave up a card it could have exploited to strong-arm Iran,” Saadoun writes. “Doha will not be deporting any Iraqi opposition member at Iraq’s request because the opposition can always be used as leverage. Doha will remain an important location for the Iraqi opposition, if not a center of support for it, especially for the Sunni Islamic parties that draw from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, because the opposition is not only a pressure card on Iraq but also on Qatar’s fellow Gulf Cooperation Council members.”

Russia wary of Turkish military in Syria

Fehim Tastekin writes that both the United States and Russia are wary of Turkish military intervention in Syria.

“What is always overlooked in the tense politics between Turkey and the Kurds is that an amplified Turkish military presence disturbs both Russia and Syria. … Russia does not want the deployment of the Turkish army and Syrian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Moscow wants to use military police detachments from friendly, Muslim countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to enforce law and order at Idlib. After the Syrian army took over Aleppo, Russia deployed a 250-strong elite military police force from Chechnya and Ingushetia,” Tastekin reports.

Last week, this column explained how the prospects of US-Russian coordination in Syria could serve to weaken Moscow’s leverage with regional players and present opportunities for Turkey to be a spoiler, including through Ankara’s improved ties with Tehran. All this depends on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan being able to manage the deft diplomacy required to right his costly intervention in Syria.

“Moscow sees the ‘Turkish threat’ as a useful instrument of political manipulation, but fears it would further complicate the process,” Tastekin writes. “The United States fears a Turkish operation against Afrin will hamper the operation at Raqqa, where the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (of which the YPG [People’s Protection Units] is a part) is trying to drive out IS. An interruption to that effort would further deepen the US-Turkey rift. … Ankara was comforted a bit by several factors: the US intention to deploy at Tabqa air base; its targeting of Syrian regime forces approaching the training base the United States had set up at the Jordanian border; and, finally, its shooting down of the Syrian plane. But he agreement between the United States and Russia last week for a deconfliction area that will cover Daraa, Suwayda and Quneitra could have opened the door a bit for cooperation between the two major powers. This meant Turkey’s effort of taking advantage of a split between the two powers was futile.”

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مزدوران عربستان محمود عباس مجاهدین خلق Iran official reacts to Abbas meeting with MKO ringleader

آن خدابنده سینگلتون در مورد فرقه ها و تروریسم و مقابله با آ«Radicalisation Awareness (Presentation at the ICSA Conference, Bordeaux, July 2017)

رجوی ویلپنت مجاهدین خلق اول ژوئیه 2014Which occasion is Maryam Rajavi celebrating in Paris? (letter to Emmanuel Macron)

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The Saudi Embrace of the MEK (Mojahedin Khalq, MKO, NCRI, Rajavi cult …) 

Saudi_Arabia_Mojahedin_Khalq_TerrorismDaniel Larison, The American Conservative, July 05 2017:… The MEK is hated in Iran for its role in the war and for its terrorism against Iranians over the years. No one genuinely interested in the freedom of Iranians would have anything to do with such a group, but of course Saudi and American hard-liners couldn’t care less about Iranian freedom. They are simply looking for ways to stoke conflict with Iran, and they see this as a way … 

زهره قائمی فرمانده ترور صیاد شیرازیBBC: Who are the Iranian dissident group MEK? (Mojahedin Khalq, MKO, PMOI, …) 

عربستان سعودی مجاهدین خلق فرقه رجوی توی تروریسمIran destroys 4 overseas terror groups, invites Saudi Arabia to be rational

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The Saudi Embrace of the MEK (Mojahedin Khalq, MKO, NCRI, Rajavi cult …) 

The Washington Times reports on the latest Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) rally:

Thousands of supporters of an Iranian dissident group rallied here Saturday for the overthrow of Tehran’s theocratic regime at an event that featured speeches by several Trump administration allies — including Newt Gingrich and Rudolph W. Giuliani — as well as the former head of Saudi intelligence.

Gingrich and Giuliani and the other Americans that appeared at the rally have been shilling for the MEK for years, so it isn’t all that surprising that they would turn up again. However, this is the second time that a Saudi prince has appeared at an MEK event, and that suggests that Riyadh is either directly supporting the group or wants everyone to think that they are. Siding with a government hostile to Iran would be nothing new for the MEK, which worked for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. The Saudi embrace of a group so widely loathed in Iran is also consistent with their poor understanding of the politics of their neighbors and the Saudi leadership’s overall poor judgment.

The MEK is hated in Iran for its role in the war and for its terrorism against Iranians over the years. No one genuinely interested in the freedom of Iranians would have anything to do with such a group, but of course Saudi and American hard-liners couldn’t care less about Iranian freedom. They are simply looking for ways to stoke conflict with Iran, and they see this as a way to do that. Their desire for toppling Iran’s government is so great that they will pretend that a deluded cult is a legitimate opposition group because they think it creates the illusion that many Iranians share their goals. In reality, most Iranians don’t want regime change, and they definitely don’t want it forced upon them from the outside by people that clearly hate them.

(END)

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ISIS ISIL Mojahedin Khalq Rajavi cult Flaqsgrooming Mojahedin Khalq (MEK, Rajavi cult) in Tirana part of bigger agenda for Albania

List-of-Mojahedin-Khalq-martyrs-Massoud-Maryam-Rajavi-MEK-fiction-fakeThe Enemy of My Enemy is NOT Always My Friend…

نمایندگان پارلمان اروپا جلسه بحث در مورد مجاهدین خلق فرقه رجویDebate in the European Parliament ‘What is to be done about the Iranian Mojahedin Khalq (MEK)?’

NEW YORK, NY - JANUARY 11: President-elect Donald Trump speaks at a news cenference at Trump Tower on January 11, 2017 in New York City. This is Trump's first official news conference since the November elections. (Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images)Trump Is At War With Iran, Not ISIS
Trump clearly has no intention of defeating terrorism.

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http://iran-interlink.org/wordpress/?p=8411

Deadly rhetoric: Saudi Arabia opens war of words with Iran 

Sharmine Narwani, Russia Today, May 16 2017:…  The US has traceable ties to some of these groups, notably Jundallah which received Bush-era funds from Washington before being listed as a terrorist organization. That “terrorist” designation, Iran knows, means little. The Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) was listed by the State Department for decades, but then de-listed in 2012 and is today being actively courted by US officials … 

مزدور مریم رجوی و ترکی الفیصل اربابشSaudi Arabia’s ambivalent relationship to terrorism

Remember.Mojahedin Khalq (MKO, MEK, Rajavi cult) was one of the excuses of US attacking Iraq

Link to the source

Deadly rhetoric: Saudi Arabia opens war of words with Iran

For years the Saudis have waged proxy battles against Iran, with little success. Now, despite this history of losses, Riyadh appears to be mobilizing for an ill-conceived confrontation with the Islamic Republic.

“We know we are a main target of Iran,” speculated Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) in an interview early this month.

Then came the threat. “We are not waiting until there becomes a battle in Saudi Arabia, so we will work so that it becomes a battle for them in Iran and not in Saudi Arabia.

These are fighting words indeed. The Iranians certainly thought so, Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan responding with unusual ferocity: “We warn them (Saudis) against doing anything ignorant, but if they do something ignorant, we will leave nowhere untouched apart from Mecca and Medina.

In other words, if the Saudis launch direct aggression against Iran, this will be Riyadh’s last war anywhere, ever.

It’s an important line to draw. The Saudis, after all, have been in meltdown since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran saw popular protests dethroning a King (gasp).
And so, for the past 38 years, we have witnessed an increasingly aggressive Saudi Arabia in the region, chasing down Iranian/Shia enemies where there were none. Just look at Yemen, where the two-year Saudi bombing blitz has killed over 10,000 civilians, or Bahrain, where Saudi troops and tanks snuffed out dissent in the Shia-majority state, or Syria, where Saudis send weapons, cash and support to ISIS, Al-Qaeda and other head-chopping extremists. This Saudi hysteria has now touched every corner of the world, and by the $100+ billion Riyadh has invested in radical schools, mosques, and propaganda to indoctrinate an entire generation of Muslims in Wahhabi-style intolerance.

But while the Saudis are hell-bent on thwarting Iranian influence – real or imagined – Riyadh has never dared to take on the Islamic Republic directly.

As former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously noted in a 2010 WikiLeaks cable, the Saudis always want to “fight the Iranians to the last American.” To which he then added, “it is time for them to get in the game.”

Now perhaps, under the direction of a 31-year old princeling, the Saudis are planning to do just that.

Saudi Arabia vs. Iran

Some perspective first on these two Persian Gulf “rivals,” in which I borrow heavily from an earlier interview of mine: 

Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are rich in energy resources and have used this rentier wealth to advance their national goals, albeit with vastly differing results. Iran’s economy is focused on diversification away from the energy sector, developing self-sufficiency and becoming a net exporter. Saudi Arabia is import-focused. Iran spends $15 billion per annum on its military – compared to Saudi’s $80 billion – yet has one of the most competent military forces in the region and builds its own hardware. The Iranian political system is Constitution-based, diverse, and representative, with loudly competing political blocs that come with their own media and constituencies. The Saudi monarchy is based entirely on the rule of one family, with no meaningful elections or contesting political bodies, and little freedom of expression in the media. Regarding power projection, Iran favors the soft power tools of diplomacy, trade, and alliance-building based on common worldviews/objectives, whereas the Saudis have expanded their influence far and wide by spreading Wahhabi doctrine through schools, mosques, media and other institutions globally – and by blatantly buying the loyalty of allies. 

In the past few years, we have clearly observed how Iran and Saudi Arabia’s nation-building approaches have affected the success of their geopolitical strategies. Both states have experienced existential fears and threats, and their respective alliances have now confronted each other on a few battlefields. Iran has approached the matter of its strategic depth carefully and built alliances with partners that genuinely share the common values of independence, self-determination, and resistance against imperialism. The Saudis, on the other hand, have forged their external alliances with hegemony or dominance as the primary objective – irrespective of the divergent interests and values of allies. There is little contest – one side is a nation- and region-building, while the other flails about with unreliable alliances, propped up by petrodollars and all the strategic brilliance of a sledgehammer.

How can this relationship be classed as a rivalry, when the two don’t even operate on the same playing field? Would Tehran even notice Riyadh outside of OPEC meetings if it weren’t so belligerent at every turn, on every border?

But MbS’s promise to bring “the battle” to Iran must be taken seriously because it will not be launched alone. The Saudi prince’s chest thumping comes courtesy of an upgrade in relations with Washington. US President Donald Trump is enthusiastically pushing billions of dollars in weapons sales to the Saudis, and has chosen Riyadh as the destination for his first official foreign visit, championing the establishment of an “Arab NATO” that partners with Israel to confront Iran.  

 

 

Don’t expect a conventional military confrontation as the opening gambit, however. The US, Israel and Saudi Arabia are experienced in subversion and sabotage activities against the Islamic Republic, and this is where they are likely to focus their initial efforts. 

Last week, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned of foreign interference in the lead-up to Friday’s presidential poll: “the security of the country should be fully protected during the elections. Anyone who violates this should know he will certainly be punished.

Calling for public vigilance, Khamenei outlined short, medium and long-term “enemy” goals in Iran: “to distort the country’s security and trigger chaos and sedition… targeting issues like that of the economy and living conditions of the people…(and) an effort to change the system.”

So how will the Saudis play a role? Riyadh’s hand in this “battle” will likely be seen on and inside Iran’s borders, in the same form we have witnessed in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and other theaters flooded with Saudi-backed militants

Stirring up minority populations

Demographically, Iran is around 60 percent ethnically Persian, followed by a mix of Azeris, Kurds, Lurs, Turkmens, Arabs, and others. Some 99 percent of Iranians are Muslim, more than 90 percent of these Shia, the rest Sunni, and the remaining one percent a mix of Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and others.

The main pockets of Kurds are in the northwest on the Iraqi/Turkish borders and in the north-east bordering Turkmenistan – Iranian Kurds are both Sunni and Shia. The second largest ethnicity, Azeris, who are mainly Shia, are also in the northwest on Iran’s border with Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Iranian Arabs who are concentrated in the south near the Iraqi border and the Persian Gulf – as well as around the Strait of Hormuz – are also mostly Shia. Iranian Sunni populations consist mainly of Kurds, Turkmens, and Balochis, and this is the demographic where signs of foreign interference are most notable today.
In recent years, thousands of Iranian security forces have been killed on the border of Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan province with Pakistan – most recently in April when ten Iranian border guards died in a cross-border terrorist raid. 

Reportedly, the operation was conducted by Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), a sectarian terrorist group the Iranians say is being directed by the US and Saudi Arabia. The US has traceable ties to some of these groups, notably Jundallah which received Bush-era funds from Washington before being listed as a terrorist organization. That “terrorist” designation, Iran knows, means little. The Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) was listed by the State Department for decades, but then de-listed in 2012 and is today being actively courted by US officials. 

Jaish al-Adl is an offshoot of Sipah-e-Sahaba, an anti-Shia extremist group banned in Pakistan, but which appears to continue to enjoy both Saudi and Pakistani support. Sipah leaders are ferried around the border areas with Pakistani guards, and fill their ranks with young graduates of Saudi-funded Deobandi madrassahs rife inside the Pakistani border. 

US hands are all over the minority map in Iran too. Media, think tanks and politicians highlight and encourage aspirations of Iranian minorities at every opportunity, and will undoubtedly take a more active role in stirring divisions as tensions escalate. 

Cue the Kurds. Both US and Saudi fingerprints are all over this project of inciting a Kurdish rebellion inside Iran. Last June and July, for the first time in 20 years, Kurds in Iran’s northwest clashed with Revolutionary Guards, killing several on both sides.

The Kurdish group involved was the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), a longtime Iranian-designated terrorist organization that announced in 2015 it would take up arms against the state. Not surprisingly, that declaration came shortly after PDKI leader Mustafa Hijri visitedcongressional leaders in Washington. 

A vigilant Iran

American dirty tricks are certainly not new in Iran. Former Kennedy-era State Department official Richard J. Barnet wrote in 1968: “The (US) intervention in Iran in 1953 to unseat Premier Mohammed Mossadeq was America’s first successful attempt in the postwar period to subvert a nationalist government.”

According to Barnet, “Five US agents and seven Iranian intelligence operatives” led by CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt “plotted the coup from a Tehran basement.” They were responsible for “recruiting street mobs to oppose the Mossadeq supporters… With the help of substantial sums, which Roosevelt used for hired demonstrators to whip up the growing anti-Mossadeq mobs, and the support of the Iranian army, heavily dependent on US equipment, the insurgents were able to turn the tide against the intractable premier and to drive him from office.”

Iran is intimately familiar with these foreign machinations and has been vigilantly countering them in the decades since the Islamic Revolution.

This is not the compliant Shah’s Iran – this Iran, today, is an independent, sovereign nation-state that came through an 8-year foreign-imposed war with Iraq and built with its own hands a formidable military deterrent. 

As we have seen with Iran’s activities in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, the country’s ‘strategic depth’ is a red line – its national borders even more so. After warning the Iraqi government in 2014 that it would take decisive action if ISIS came within 40 kilometers of its border, the Iranian air force – for the first time since the Iran-Iraq war – used F-4 Phantom fighter jets to conduct airstrikes in Diyala province on its western border.

Iran’s armed forces chief Mohammad Hossein Bagheri has also now threatened military action on Pakistani territory unless Islamabad takes control of its borders, saying: “Unfortunately, the Pakistani border area has turned into a refuge and training ground for terrorists hired by Saudi Arabia, with the approval of the United States.” 

In a letter this month to the UN Security Council, Iran’s UN Ambassador Gholamali Khoshrooaddressed the Saudi threats: “We have no desire, nor any interest, in an escalation of tension in our neighborhood…We continue to stand ready for dialogue and accommodation to promote regional stability, combat destabilizing extremist violence and reject sectarian hatred…We hope Saudi Arabia will be persuaded to heed the call of reason.” 

The Saudi princeling Mohammad bin Salman made a novice’s mistake by threatening to bring war to Iran – he put the world on notice. Any Iranian reaction now bears the full legitimacy of international law for a measured retaliation. The Saudi borders are long, its populations restive, and its soldiers have not seen this kind of war. We may yet live to see a Saudi royal eat his words.

The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.

Sharmine Narwani is a commentator and analyst of Middle East geopolitics. She is a former senior associate at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University and has a master’s degree in International Relations from Columbia University. Sharmine has written commentary for a wide array of publications, including Al Akhbar English, the New York Times, the Guardian, Asia Times Online, Salon.com, USA Today, the Huffington Post, Al Jazeera English, BRICS Post and others. You can follow her on Twitter at @snarwani

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Anne Singleton: Key to de-radicalization of MEK hostages in Albania are their families

IMPAKT 55 – Muxhahedinet iraniane ne Shqiperi. Interviste eksluzive me Anne Singleton
https://youtu.be/8v-Q7UWfN3M

تعلیم دیدگان صدام مجاهدین خلق رجوی از عراق تا آلبانیAlbanian citizens fearful of radicalised Mojahedin Khalq neighbours deserve more information

Can Albania deradicalise Mojahedin Khalq Rajavi cultMassoud Khodabandeh, Huffington Post: Can Albania Meet its Obligations and De-radicalize an Influx of Terrorists into Europe? 

Mojahedin Khalq (MKO, MEK, Rajavi cult) Our Men in Iran? (Seymour M. Hersh, The New Yorker, April 2012)

مریم رجوی داعش تروریسم Mojahedin Khalq (MKO, NCRI, Rajavi cult) terrorists openly declare support for ISIL, terror acts

احمد صحوبیMojahedin Khalq ( MEK, MKO, NCRI, Rajavi cult) Affiliated Terrorist Ring Disbanded in Southeastern Iran

Grand Controversy as MEK can’t prove leader Massoud Rajavi is dead or alive

2016-06-30-1467308500-6000440-download.jpgMaryam Rajavi — MEK Propaganda Queen — Advertises Her Serives For Iran’s Enemies

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http://iran-interlink.org/wordpress/?p=8176

Iran: The role of Saudi Arabia in creating and supporting terrorist groups 

 Rajavi_Faisal_1Tasnim News, March 01 2017:… “One cannot easily overlook the role of this country (Saudi Arabia) in creating and supporting defeated terrorist groups in Iraq and the irreparable damages inflicted by these groups on regional countries, particularly Iraq and Syria,” he went on to say.Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir on Saturday made a rare visit to Baghdad as the first by a high-ranking Saudi … 

عربستان سعودی مجاهدین خلق داعش و تروریسمWorld knows Saudi Arabia is source of terrorism

No Real Change Seen in Saudi Behavior: Iran’s Shamkhani

Link to the source

TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Shamkhani said the country would welcome moves by Saudi Arabia to make up for its past mistakes but nothing has happened to that effect yet.
“… we would consider as positive any attempt by countries that support terrorism, especially Saudi Arabia, to (abandon) their past destructive policies and make up for their mistakes,” Shamkhani told reporters on the sidelines of a cultural event in Tehran on Monday.

“However,” he added, “No real change in the behavior of these countries has been seen.”

He made the remarks in response to a question about a recent trip by Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister to Baghdad.

“One cannot easily overlook the role of this country (Saudi Arabia) in creating and supporting defeated terrorist groups in Iraq and the irreparable damages inflicted by these groups on regional countries, particularly Iraq and Syria,” he went on to say.

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir on Saturday made a rare visit to Baghdad as the first by a high-ranking Saudi official since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Last week, Shamkhani said Saudi Arabia’s brazen support for Takfiri terrorist groups has become a source of concern for many Western and regional governments.

A regular topic in talks with the officials of various Western and Middle East countries have been their “harsh criticism” of Saudi policies and their concerns about the kingdom’s measures to create and support terrorism, Shamkhani said at a meeting with Speaker of the People’s Council of Syria Hadiya Khalaf Abbas in Tehran on Wednesday.

Iran’s Shamkhani Highlights Western Concern about Saudi Policies

Link to the source

TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Shamkhani said Saudi Arabia’s brazen support for Takfiri terrorist groups has become a source of concern for many Western and regional governments.
A regular topic in talks with the officials of various Western and Middle East countries have been their “harsh criticism” of Saudi policies and their concerns about the kingdom’s measures to create and support terrorism, Shamkhani said at a meeting with Speaker of the People’s Council of Syria Hadiya Khalaf Abbas in Tehran on Wednesday.

The irony is that today, the biggest sponsors of Takfiri terrorism who have jeopardized world security are blatantly accusing Iran of threatening peace, Shamkhani deplored.

He also described instrumental use of terrorism as a “fixed policy” of the Zionist regime of Israel and Saudi rulers.

For her part, the Syrian speaker pointed to Israel’s logistical and military support for the terrorist groups fighting against the Damascus government, saying such backing reveals “close bonds between Israel and Takfiri terrorism” for the purpose of destabilizing the region.

Syria has been gripped by civil war since March 2011 with various terrorist groups, including Daesh (also known as ISIS or ISIL), currently controlling parts of it.

According to a report by the Syrian Center for Policy Research, the conflict has claimed the lives of over 470,000 people, injured 1.9 million others, and displaced nearly half of the country’s pre-war population of about 23 million within or beyond its borders. 

(END)

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Also read:
http://iran-interlink.org/wordpress/?p=8096

Iran: Joint Takfiri – MKO plot against Iran failed (aka: Mojahedin Khalq, MEK, Rjavi cult)

عربستان سعودی مجاهدین خلق داعش و تروریسمTasnim News, January 28 2017:… President of the Supreme National Defense University of Iran described Takfiri (extremist) movements as a scheme to impede Iran’s regional influence, saying Takfiris even look for intelligence aid from the terrorist Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) to harm Iran. Addressing a cultural ceremony in Tehran on Friday, Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi said there is clear evidence that …

عربستان سعودی مجاهدین خلق داعش و تروریسمMEK (Mojahedin Khalq, Rajavi cult) and Saudis isolated as world leaders send condolences for Rafsanjani’s death

Link to the source

Iran: Joint Takfiri – MKO plot against Iran failed (aka: Mojahedin Khalq, MEK, Rjavi cult)

Countering Iran Main Purpose of Takfiris: Iranian General
News ID: 1309790 Service: Politics
January, 28, 2017 – 10:25

TEHRAN (Tasnim) – President of the Supreme National Defense University of Iran described Takfiri (extremist) movements as a scheme to impede Iran’s regional influence, saying Takfiris even look for intelligence aid from the terrorist Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) to harm Iran.

Addressing a cultural ceremony in Tehran on Friday, Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi said there is clear evidence that Takfiri terrorist groups show no hostility toward the Zionists and make no mention of the US either, but have concentrated on countering Iran’s influence.

Takfiris intend to get intelligence help from the MKO terrorists to carry out operations inside Iran, and seek to establish contact with all anti-Iranian groups, he warned.

The top general also made a reference to the supports that certain regional countries provide for the terrorist groups, saying this has made them argue that Turkey should be the region’s top power.

Takfiri terrorist groups have plans to make safe havens for their leaders in Jordan, General Vahidi noted.

More than two years ago, Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei had warned that Takfiri groups have resurfaced to serve the interests of the arrogant powers, and called for a “scientific, inclusive” movement to eradicate the threat of Takfirism.

“The Takfiri movements and their sponsoring states are utterly serving the arrogant powers’ objectives, namely (the objectives of) the US and the European colonialist governments as well as the Zionist regime (of Israel). They are practically serving them under an Islamic guise,” Ayatollah Khamenei said in November 2014.

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Also read:
http://iran-interlink.org/wordpress/?p=8039

Iran arrests MKO (Mojahedin Khalq, MEK, NCRI, Rajavi cult …) ringleader in Isfahan 

Albanian_Mafia Mojahedin_Khalq TerroristsPress TV, January 01 2017:… Iranian media reported on Wednesday that the MKO member had been arrested the day before in the central city of Isfahan. The terrorist had been identified by Iranian security forces before entering the country, according to the reports. The individual had come to Iran with the aim of creating chaos during the funeral of Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who passed away on Sunday and … 

مجاهدین خلق در آلبانی به جان هم افتاده اندAlbania: What would a de-radicalization program for the Mojahedin Khalq (Rajavi cult) involve

همکاری مافیای آلبانی و مجاهدین خلق، فرقه رجوی Mojahedin Khalq (Rajavi cult) and Albanian Mafia are getting closer

خاکسپاری آیت الله هاشمی رفسنجانیMEK (Mojahedin Khalq, Rajavi cult) and Saudis isolated as world leaders send condolences for Rafsanjani’s death

Link to the source

Iran arrests MKO (Mojahedin Khalq, MEK, NCRI, Rajavi cult …) ringleader in Isfahan

Iran’s security forces have arrested a ringleader of the terrorist Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), who was seeking to create chaos during the funeral procession of a senior Iranian official in the capital Tehran.

Iranian media reported on Wednesday that the MKO member had been arrested the day before in the central city of Isfahan. The terrorist had been identified by Iranian security forces before entering the country, according to the reports.

The individual had come to Iran with the aim of creating chaos during the funeral of Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who passed away on Sunday and was laid to rest on Tuesday.

Huge crowds of Iranian mourners from all walks of life turned out in Tehran for the funeral of the late chairman of Iran’s Expediency Council and two-time president. The funeral was also attended by senior political, military and religious figures.

خاکسپاری آیت الله هاشمی رفسنجانی

Mourners take part in the funeral of former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in Tehran, Iran, on January 10, 2017

The terrorist had reportedly recorded numerous videos for MKO-affiliated satellite channels.

The MKO, the most hated terrorist group among the Iranians, has carried out numerous terrorist attacks against Iranian civilians and government officials over the past three decades.

Out of the nearly 17,000 Iranians killed in terrorist assaults since the victory of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, about 12,000 have fallen victim to MKO’s acts of terror.

The terrorist group also sided with the former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, during Iraq’s eight-year imposed war against Iran in the 1980s. The group also helped Saddam in his brutal crackdown on his opponents. 

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Also read:
http://iran-interlink.org/wordpress/?p=7794

Albanian citizens fearful of radicalised Mojahedin Khalq neighbours deserve more information 

Radicalised Mojahedin Khalq from Iraq to AlbaniaAnne and Massoud Khodabandeh, Huffington post (and Top Topic), October 09 2016:… For the local citizens, mystery surrounds their arrival and their lifestyle. Should these secretive and covert neighbours be treated with suspicion or kindness? At a local level, the first thing neighbouring families need to be aware of is that among all MEK members, sexual relations have been banned for over 25 years. This means there are no marriages or children or young people in the organisation. More troubling … 

Albanian citizens fearful of radicalised Mojahedin Khalq neighbours deserve more information

Albanian citizens fearful of radicalised Mojahedin Khalq neighbours deserve more information

Link to the original (Huffington Post)
Link to the same article (Top Topic)
Link to the translation (Albanian) 

Albanian citizens fearful of radicalised Mojahedin Khalq neighbours deserve more information

By Anne and Massoud Khodabandeh

تعلیم دیدگان صدام مجاهدین خلق رجوی از عراق تا آلبانی

When the MEK were finally expelled from Iraq in August 2016, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry voiced its “deep satisfaction” with the relocation of the MEK in Albania. International efforts to solve the crisis were met with “outstanding success,” a statement read.

‘Deep satisfaction’ is an understatement. Since 2003, the MEK – known asSaddam’s Private Army – has been linked to the insurrectionists which included former Saddamists and Al Qaida in Iraq and later Daesh whom the MEK called ‘revolutionary brothers’. In 2009 serious efforts began to expel the group. The MEK refused to cooperate, issuing credible mass suicide threats against any interference. In 2011, the government of Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN to facilitate this effort. The MEK still refused to cooperate.

Neither was it straightforward to relocate an entire terrorist group. In 2013 Romania refused to take them. Instead, a $9m deal was struck by the US with the government of Albania to take an initial 210. In March 2013, the Obama Administration urged the MEK leadership to “accept the government of Albania’s humanitarian offer immediately, and urges the residents of Camp [Liberty] to resume participation in resettlement interviews to ensure that individuals avail themselves of safe and secure relocation opportunities outside Iraq”. The MEK rejected the offer. The transfer process slowed and often stalled over the next three years.

It was only over the summer of 2016 when it became clear that Daesh and the Saddamists would be flushed out of Mosul and Daesh’s dream of establishing its abhorrent Caliphate in Iraq had been crushed, that the MEK finally accepted to leave. By this time the MEK had sustained 200 deaths and even more injuries as their camp was repeatedly attacked by enemies. For sure the Iraqis had good reason to be glad to see the back of them.

Now in Albania many questions surround the arrival of the MEK. Since 2013, when the government announced publicly that 210 MEK would be accepted in the country, there has been no official communication with the citizenry about the numbers or the purpose of this influx, even though the government’s resettlement package has reached $20m. With upward of 2500 terrorists now located in Tirana, what does this mean for Albania and Albanians? What is the missing backstory and where lies a credible explanation for the MEK’s deviant behaviour?

The first thing we can state is that there is no programme in Albania to de-radicalisethese people. They were transferred as an intact group and there are no plans to disband them. Although international law forbids the UN from granting asylum to terrorists or even to a political group, this is what apparently has happened here.

Evidence that this group is not going to be de-radicalised is not difficult to obtain. Some members when interviewed have already said they only intend to stay in Albania “until the Iranian regime is toppled”. Journalists would only then need to ask why the members are denied any form of family life – marriage and children are banned in the MEK – to elicit the answer ‘so we can focus fully on our struggle’. It is an overt admission that they are not about to abandon their activities as a terrorist group. They are not willing to submit to de-radicalisation.

https://youtu.be/SjeRiz2YcwI

But how do we know they are radicalised at all? What threat, if any, do these people pose to Albanian society?

For the local citizens, mystery surrounds their arrival and their lifestyle. Should these secretive and covert neighbours be treated with suspicion or kindness? At a local level, the first thing neighbouring families need to be aware of is that among all MEK members, sexual relations have been banned for over 25 years. This means there are no marriages or children or young people in the organisation. More troubling are the obligatory confessional meetings in which members are required to admit any sexual thoughts or feelings and be punished for them. With this emphasis on sexual matters, it is not known how such people may react when they come in contact with ordinary people and their children.

Local people will notice that the behaviour, body language and appearance of the MEK are not normal. They will intuitively understand that there is something deviant in these people but will not, without further knowledge, have the means to explain it.

In short it is the result of radicalisation. This is a process of ongoing brainwashing which suppresses the authentic self and emotions and replaces them with the zealous ideological mindset of terrorists.

These people dress, walk and hold themselves differently. Their utilitarian, beggar-like clothes are easily identifiable as thinly disguised uniforms. They do not readily engage with outsiders. Most of them remain isolated behind closed doors and curtains. Those who do come outside are the trusted members who have been successfully re-charged with fresh ideological zeal. They come outside for specific missions such as buying mobile phones, not for enjoyment or leisure. More senior members, travelling covertly in vehicles, will be involved in other more secretive and troubling activities.

In public, the MEK may appear friendly and confident, condescending even, since they feel themselves superior to outsiders. However, because they are very much focused on their own self-preservation and that of their group, this means they cannot engage on a more personal level or talk about everyday issues and will become agitated if pressed beyond their capacity and knowledge.

As a result of radicalisation they have a black and white world view, operate with a very narrow range of emotions and are reluctant to question or be questioned. They display a phobic response to the outside world. Indeed, the MEK do not have an ‘outside’ to which they want to return. Their whole lives revolve around obedience to their group and its leaders.

Radicalisation makes them obedient to orders. The MEK know themselves as ‘living martyrs’ which means they accept death at any time if ordered by their leaders to kill or perform a suicide mission.

What the Albanian authorities are dealing with is not only radicalised combatants but combatants who have been fully trained in terrorism and security tactics by Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard and Mokhabarat (secret services). They may be old and some may be sick, but they remain programmed to obey orders and are prepared to die or kill for their beliefs. They are trained to dissemble. They can operate easily using two or three false identities. (Complicated by the fact many arrived in Albania using false identities.) They can set people up, obscure their tracks and hide in plain sight. Transferring these people from Iraq to Albania is the equivalent of moving terrorists from Syria to Europe. The challenges posed by these facts cannot be ignored or minimised.

https://youtu.be/QKu4Tm7-J3A

So, if the MEK are not going to be disbanded and de-radicalised, what will they be doing in Albania?

The MEK has a long history of terrorist activity, and its belief system is rooted in violence, but the MEK’s modern role is not military. While in Iraq, the group fulfilled vital facilitating functions for Saddam Hussein, mostly in Europe, doing what he couldn’t do under international sanctions: selling oil under the UN oil-for-food programme; procuring weapons and military equipment; purchasing chemical components for WMDs; money laundry; people trafficking; intimidation and murder of opponents; and undertaking public relations work in the West, including corrupting politicians.

It is anticipated that the MEK will perform a similar facilitating function in Albania, but this time serving modern terrorist groups like Daesh and smaller groups. (The MEK is in part funded by Saudi Arabia.) Albania’s location and historic problems with organised crime and corruption still render the country vulnerable to exploitation by groups like the MEK. It is known that over the past three years, the MEK have already developed relations with criminal gangs and corrupt government officials.

The danger lies in the MEK’s sophisticated capacity to propagandise and deceive political and public opinion, while at the same time performing outrageously damaging activities for the host country. Not only are the MEK fully trained by Saddam’s Intelligence service, but radicalisation means they have no moral, social or religious boundaries whatsoever. For them, all criminal activity is justified by their ideological belief that they can and must do anything for their cause.

Just as the MEK hosted Al Qaida and other insurgents in Iraq, the group is now fully placed to act as a hideout and training provider for the jihadis and terrorists who currently threaten the security of the whole Middle East.

If Albania fails to de-radicalise these people, the consequences could be severe. It is up to the Albanian people to demand a satisfactory explanation from their government. Is this really the humanitarian mission that Albania signed up for?

Qytetarët shqiptarë të frikësuar nga grupi Muxhahedin Halk i radikalizuar meritojnë më shumë informacion

Published08 Tetor 2016

Kur muxhahedinët e Iranit (MEK) u dëbuan përfundimisht nga Iraku në gusht 2016, Ministria e Jashtme e Irakut shprehu ‘kënaqësi të thellë’ për zhvendosjen e MEK në Shqipëri. Përpjekjet ndërkombëtare për të zgjidhur krizën takuan një ‘sukses të jashtëzakonshëm’, lexohet në deklaratë.

‘Kënaqësi e thellë’ është pak. Që nga viti 2003, MEK – të njohur si Ushtria Private e Sadamit – kanë qenë të lidhur me shokë të tjerë rebelë ku përfshhen ish-sadamistët dhe Al Kaeda në Irak, dhe më vonë Daesh(ISIS), të cilët MEK i ka quajtur ‘vëllezër revolucionarë’. Në vitin 2009 filloi përpjekja serioze për ta dëbuar grupin. MEK nuk pranoi të bashkëpunojë,duke lëshuar kërcënime masive për vetëvrasje kundër çdo ndërhyrjeje. Në vitin 2011, qeveria e Irakut ka nënshkruar një Memorandum Mirëkuptimi me OKB-në për të lehtësuar këtë përpjekje. MEK sërish nuk pranoi të bashkëpunojë.

As zhvendosja e tërë grupit terrorist nuk ishte e thjeshtë. Në vitin 2013 Rumania nuk pranoi t’i marrë ata. Kështu, në vend të kësaj, SHBA lidhi një marrëveshje prej 9 milionë dollarësh me qeverinë e Shqipërisë për të marrë një grup fillestar prej 210 personash. Në mars të vitit 2013, administrata Obama i bëri thirrje udhëheqësit të MEK ‘të pranojë menjëherë ofertën humanitare të qeverisë Shqiptare, dhe t’u bëjë thirrje banorëve të Kampit që të rifillojnë pjesëmarrjen në intervistat e risistemimit, për t’u siguruar që individët të përfitojnë nga mundësitë e sigurta të zhvendosjes jashtë Irakut’. MEK e refuzoi ofertën. Procesi i transferimit është ngadalësuar dhe shpesh penguar gjatë tre viteve të ardhshme.

Vetëm gjatë verës së vitit 2016, kur u bë e qartë se Daesh dhe sadamistët do të nxirreshin jashtë nga Mosuli, dhe se ëndrra e Daesh për krijimin e Kalifatit të pështirë në Irak ishte shtypur, MEK më në fund pranoi të largohet. Në këtë kohë MEK kishte pësuar 200 të vdekur dhe akoma më shumë të plagosur pasi kampi i tyre u sulmua vazhdimisht nga armiqtë. Sigurisht që irakenët kishin arsye të forta për të qenë të lumtur për zbrapjsen e tyre.

Tani ardhjen e MEK në Shqipëri e rrethojnë shumë pyetje. Që nga viti 2013, kur qeveria njoftoi publikisht se 210 pjestarë të MEK do të pranohen në vend, nuk ka pasur asnjë komunikim zyrtar me qytetarët në lidhje me numrat apo qëllimin e këtij fluksi, edhe pse paketa zhvendosëse e qeverisë ka arritur në 20 milionë dollarë. Më shumë se 2500 terroristë ndodhen tani në Tiranë; çfarë do të thotë kjo për Shqipërinë dhe shqiptarët? Cila është prapaskena që mungon dhe ku mund të gjendet një shpjegim i besueshëm për sjelljen devijante të MEK?

Gjëja e parë që mund të themi është se nuk ka asnjë program në Shqipëri për të de-radikalizuar këta njerëz. Ata u transferuan si një grup i paprekur dhe nuk ka asnjë  plan për t’i shpërndarë. Edhe pse ligji ndërkombëtar e ndalon OKB-në nga dhënia e azilit për terroristët apo qoftë edhe për një grup politik, kjo është ajo që me sa duket ka ndodhur këtu.

Prova se ky grup nuk do të de-radikalizohet nuk është e vështirë për t’u siguruar. Disa anëtarë tashmë të intervistuar kanë thënë se ata kanë për qëllim vetëm të qëndrojnë në Shqipëri , ‘derisa regjimi iranian të rrëzohet’. Pra gazetarëve do t’u duhet vetëm t’i pyesin se pse anëtarëve iu është mohuar çdo formë e jetës familjare – martesa dhe fëmijët janë të ndaluara në MEK – për të marrë përgjigjen: ‘kështu ne mund të përqëndrohemi plotësisht në luftën tonë’. Është një pohim i hapur se ata nuk kanë ndërmend t’i braktisin aktivitetet e tyre si një grup terrorist. Ata nuk janë të gatshëm për t’u paraqitur për de-radikalizim.

Por si e dimë ne se ata janë totalisht të radikalizuar? Çfarë kërcënimi, nëse ekziston, këta njerëz paraqesin për shoqërinë shqiptare?

Për qytetarët lokalë, ardhja dhe mënyra e jetesës së tyre mbetet mister. Këto fqinjë sekretë dhe të fshehtë duhet të trajtohen me dyshim apo mirësi? Në nivel lokal, gjëja e parë që familjet fqinje duhet të dinë është se në mesin e të gjithë anëtarëve të MEK, marrëdhëniet seksuale janë ndaluar për më shumë se 25 vjet. Kjo do të thotë se nuk ka martesa, fëmijë ose të rinj në organizatë. Më shqetësuese janë takimet e detyrueshme konfesionale në të cilat anëtarët duhet të pranojnë ndonjë mendim apo ndjenjë seksuale dhe të dënohen për to. Me këtë detyrim në çështjet seksuale, nuk mund ta dimë se si mund të reagojnë njerëz të  tillë, kur vijnë në kontakt me njerëzit e zakonshëm dhe fëmijët e tyre.

Vendasit do të vënë re se sjellja, gjuha e trupit dhe pamja e muxhahedinëve nuk janë normale. Ata në mënyrë intuitive do ta kuptojnë se ka diçka të devijuar në këta njerëz, por nuk do munden, pa njohuri të mëtejshme, të gjejnë mënyrën për ta shpjeguar.

Me pak fjalë ky është rezultat i radikalizmit. Ky është një proces i vazhdueshëm ndërrimi pikëpamjesh që shtyp veten dhe emocionet dhe i zëvendëson ato me mendimin e zellshëm ideologjik të terroristëve.

Këta njerëz vishen, ecin dhe e mbajnë veten ndryshe. Veshjet e tyre modeste, si veshje lypësi, janë lehtësisht të identifikueshme si uniforma maskuese. Ata nuk janë të gatshëm të angazhohen me të huajt. Shumica e tyre mbeten të izoluar prapa dyerve të mbyllura dhe perdeve. Ata që dalin jashtë janë anëtarë të besuar të cilët e kanë përvetësuar me sukses zellin e freskët ideologjik. Ata dalin jashtë për misione të veçanta të tilla si blerja e telefonave celularë, jo për kënaqësi apo kohë të lirë. Anëtarë më të lartë, që udhëtojnë fshehurazi në automjete, janë të përfshirë në aktivitete të tjera më të fshehta dhe më shqetësuese.

Në publik, muxhahedinët mund të duken miqësorë dhe të sigurt, mospërfillës madje, pasi ata e ndjejnë veten më superiorë se të jashtmit. Megjithatë, për shkak se ata janë shumë të përqendruar në ruajtjen e vetes dhe të grupit të tyre, sigurisht që nuk mund të angazhohen në një nivel më personal apo të flasin për çështje të përditshme, dhe madje do të bëhen nervozë nëse i shtyn përtej kapacitetit dhe njohurive të tyre.

Si rezultat i radikalizmit ata kanë një pamje bardhë e zi për botën, veprojnë me një gamë shumë të ngushtë emocionesh dhe janë ngurrues për të pyetur apo për t’u pyetur. Ata shfaqin një përgjigje të frikësuar ndaj botës së jashtme. Në të vërtetë, muxhahedinët nuk kanë një ‘jashtë’ te e cila ata duan të kthehen. Gjithë jeta e tyre sillet rreth bindjes ndaj grupit të tyre dhe udhëheqësve të tij.

Radikalizimi i bën ata të bindur ndaj urdhrave. MEK e dinë veten si ‘dëshmorë të gjallë’ që do të thotë se ata e pranojnë vdekjen në çdo kohë, nëse urdhërohen nga udhëheqësit e tyre për të vrarë ose për të kryer një mision vetëvrasës.

Ajo me të cilën po përballen autoritetet shqiptare nuk janë vetëm luftëtarët e radikalizuar, por luftëtarët të cilët janë plotësisht të trajnuar në taktikat e terrorizmit dhe të sigurisë nga Garda e Republikës së Sadam Huseinit dhe Mokhabarat (shërbime sekrete). Ata mund të jenë të vjetër dhe disa mund të jenë të sëmurë, por ata mbeten të programuar që t’u binden urdhrave dhe janë të përgatitur për të vdekur apo për të vrarë për bindjet e tyre. Ata janë të trajnuar për t’u fshehur. Ata mund të operojnë lehtë duke përdorur dy ose tre identitete të rreme. (E komplikuar nga fakti se shumë prej tyre kanë mbërritur në Shqipëri duke përdorur identitete të rreme.) Ata mund të krijojnë identitete, të fshehin gjurmët e tyre dhe të fshihen sy për sy. Transferimi i këtyre njerëzve nga Iraku në Shqipëri është ekuivalent me lëvizjen e terroristëve nga Siria në Evropë. Sfidat e paraqitura nga këto fakte nuk mund të injorohen apo të minimizohen.

Pra, në qoftë se MEK nuk do të shpërbëhen dhe de-radikalizohen, çfarë të jenë duke bërë në Shqipëri vallë?

MEK ka një histori të gjatë të veprimtarisë terroriste, si dhe sistemi i tij i besimit është i rrënjosur në dhunë, por roli modern i MEK nuk është ushtarak. Në Irak, grupi përmbushte funksionet vitale lehtësuese për Sadam Huseinin, dhe kryesisht në Evropë, ata bënin atë që ai nuk mundi të bëjë nën sanksionet ndërkombëtare: shitjen e naftës nën programin e OKB-së naftë-për-ushqim; sigurimin e armëve dhe pajisjeve ushtarake; blerjen e komponentëve kimikë të Shkatërrrimit në Masë; larjen e parave; trafikimin e njerëzve; frikësimin dhe vrasjen e kundërshtarëve dhe ndërmarrjen e marrëdhënieve publike në Perëndim, duke përfshirë edhe korruptimin e politikanëve.

Është parashikuar që MEK do të kryejë një funksion të ngjashëm lehtësues në Shqipëri, por këtë herë duke u shërbyer grupeve moderne terroriste si Daesh dhe grupeve më të vogla. (MEK është pjesërisht i financuar nga Arabia Saudite.) Vendndodhja e Shqipërisë dhe problemet historike me krimin e organizuar dhe korrupsionin ende bëjnë që vendi të jetë i pambrojtur ndaj shfrytëzimit nga grupet si MEK. Është e njohur se gjatë tre viteve të fundit, muxhahedinët kanë zhvilluar tashmë marrëdhënie me bandat kriminale dhe zyrtarët e korruptuar të qeverisë.

Rreziku qëndron në kapacitetin e sofistikuar të MEK për të propaganduar dhe mashtruar opinionin politik dhe publik, e duke kryer në të njëjtën kohë aktivitete të dëmshme të patolerueshme për vendin pritës. Jo vetëm që muxhahedinët janë plotësisht të trajnuar nga shërbimi Inteligjencës së Sadamit, por radikalizimi do të thotë se ata nuk kanë kufij moralë, socialë, fetarë apo cfarëdoqofshin. Për ata, i gjithë aktiviteti kriminal është i shfajësuar nëpërmjet besimit të tyre ideologjik që ata mund dhe duhet të bëjnë cdo gjë për kauzën e tyre.

Ashtu sic priti Al Kaedën dhe kryengritësit e tjerë në Irak, MEK tashmë është vendosur plotësisht për të vepruar si një vend i izoluar dhe trajnues për xhihadistët dhe terroristët, të cilët aktualisht kërcënojnë sigurinë e të gjithë Lindjes së Mesme.

Nëse Shqipëria nuk arrin të de-radikalizojë këta njerëz, pasojat mund të jenë të rënda. Është në dorë të popullit shqiptar për të kërkuar një shpjegim të kënaqshëm nga qeveria e tyre. A është ky me të vërtetë misioni humanitar për të cilin Shqipëria ka nënshkruar? / Gazeta Impakt

Burimi: Huffington

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Anne Khodabandeh (Singleton), Iran Interlink, November 01 2014: … When a supporter of ISIS sits in the French parliamentary building and attacks President Obama, the cracks are seriously beginning to show in the West’s approach to resolving the whole Middle East situation. Observers may not be sufficiently informed to tell Western governments what to do in …

Azar (Mona) Hossein Nejad asks UNHCR to transfer her sister out of Camp Liberty

Azar Hossein Nejad, Hossin Nejad weblog, January 01 2015:…  I am contacting you to ask for your help regarding the situation of my sister, Zeinab Hossein Nejad, a 36 years old woman who is living in Camp Liberty in Baghdad, Iraq.  I never saw my parents or sister during my childhood and youth as all of them had to run for their lives. They left Iran along …  

European Conservatives line up with Iranian hardliners (Stevenson, Vidal-Quadras)

فریده فرحیFarideh Farhi, Lobelog, April 22 2014: … members (some of them with links to the exiled Iranian opposition group, the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK), such as Spanish EPP member Alejo Vidal-Quadras and British ECR member Struan Stevenson) proposed amendments deleting the call for an opening of the EU office in Tehran, fully in line with the position of their supposed enemies — Iranian hardliners …

Zahra Moeini: Situation of women in Camp Liberty (Mojahedin Khalq, Rajavi cult)

زهرا معینیNejat Association reporting from , Ashraf news, April 21 2014: …  Massoud Rajavi has ordered the officials of the Camp to intensify the limitations against women especially after the revelations by Batoul Soltani and other dispatched members who bravely exposed the internal affairs especially the sexual scandals of the cult leader such as ‘Salvation dancing’ …