Joseph Thomas, New Eastern Outlook, October 01 2018:… MEK is not only refusing to renounce violence, MEK’s most senior leader has just publicly and unambiguously declared MEK’s policy is to openly wield violence inside Iran toward destabilizing and overthrowing the government.From the United States’ ignoring of its own anti-terrorism laws – aiding and abetting MEK while still …
US-Delisted MEK Terrorists (Mojahedin Khalq, MKO, NCRI, Rajavi cult …) Still Openly Committed to Violence
In 2012, the US State Department would delist anti-Iranian terrorist group – Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) – from its Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list. Yet years later, MEK has demonstrated an eager desire to carry out political violence on a scale that eclipses the previous atrocities that had it designated a terrorist organization in the first place.
In the US State Department’s official statement published in September 2012, the rationale for delisting MEK would be as follows (emphasis added):
With today’s actions, the Department does not overlook or forget the MEK’s past acts of terrorism, including its involvement in the killing of U.S. citizens in Iran in the 1970s and an attack on U.S. soil in 1992. The Department also has serious concerns about the MEK as an organization, particularly with regard to allegations of abuse committed against its own members.
The Secretary’s decision today took into account the MEK’s public renunciation of violence, the absence of confirmed acts of terrorism by the MEK for more than a decade, and their cooperation in the peaceful closure of Camp Ashraf, their historic paramilitary base.
Yet US policy before the State Department’s delisting, and events ever since, have proven this rationale for removing MEK as an FTO to be an intentional fabrication – that MEK was and still is committed to political violence against the Iranian people, and envisions a Libya-Syrian-style conflict to likewise divide and destroy the Iranian nation.
However, facts regarding the true nature of MEK is not derived from Iranian state media, or accusations made by MEK’s opponents in Tehran, but by MEK’s own US sponsors and even MEK’s senior leadership itself.
“Undeniably” MEK “Conducted Terrorist Attacks”
By the admissions of the United States and the United Kingdom, MEK is undeniably a terrorist organization guilty of self-admitted acts of terrorism. The UK House of Commons in a briefing paper titled, “The People’s Mujahiddeen of Iran (PMOI),” it cites the UK Foreign Office which states explicitly that:
The Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK) is proscribed in the UK under the Terrorism Act 2000. It has a long history of involvement in terrorism in Iran and elsewhere and is, by its own admission, responsible for violent attacks that have resulted in many deaths.
The briefing paper makes mention of “assiduous” lobbying efforts by MEK to have itself removed from terrorist lists around the globe.
Perhaps the most prominent (and certainly the most controversial) opposition group that has attracted attention as a potential U.S. proxy is the NCRI (National Council of Resistance of Iran), the political movement established by the MeK (Mujahedin-e Khalq). Critics believe the group to be undemocratic and unpopular, and indeed anti-American.
Brookings would concede to MEK’s terrorist background, admitting (emphasis added):
Undeniably, the group has conducted terrorist attacks—often excused by the MeK’s advocates because they are directed against the Iranian government. For example, in 1981, the group bombed the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party, which was then the clerical leadership’s main political organization, killing an estimated 70 senior officials. More recently, the group has claimed credit for over a dozen mortar attacks, assassinations, and other assaults on Iranian civilian and military targets between 1998 and 2001.
Brookings makes mention of MEK’s attacks on US servicemen and American civilian contractors which earned it its place on the US FTO, noting:
In the 1970s, the group killed three U.S. officers and three civilian contractors in Iran.
And despite MEK’s current depiction as a popular resistance movement in Iran, Brookings would also admit (emphasis added):
The group itself also appears to be undemocratic and enjoys little popularity in Iran itself. It has no political base in the country, although it appears to have an operational presence. In particular, its active participation on Saddam Husayn’s side during the bitter Iran-Iraq War made the group widely loathed. In addition, many aspects of the group are cultish, and its leaders, Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, are revered to the point of obsession.
Brookings would note that despite the obvious reality of MEK, the US could indeed use the terrorist organization as a proxy against Iran, but notes that:
…at the very least, to work more closely with the group (at least in an overt manner), Washington would need to remove it from the list of foreign terrorist organizations.
And from 2009 onward, that is precisely what was done. It is unlikely that the MEK alone facilitated the rehabilitation of its image or exclusively sought its removal from US-European terrorist organization lists – considering the central role MEK terrorists played in US regime change plans versus Iran.
Today, the ruling mullahs’ fear is amplified by the role of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and resistance units in leading and continuing the uprisings. Regime analysts say: “The definitive element in relation to the December 2017 riots is the organization of rioters. So-called Units of Rebellion have been created, which have both the ability to increase their forces and the potential to replace leaders on the spot.”
The roadmap for freedom reveals itself in these very uprisings, in ceaseless protests, and in the struggle of the Resistance Units.
Despite its limited popularity (but perhaps because of its successful use of terrorism), the Iranian regime is exceptionally sensitive to the MEK and is vigilant in guarding against it.
To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Administration has coöperated with Saudi Arabia’s government, which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda.
Also in retrospect, it is clear how US-engineered conflict and regime change has impacted the Middle Eastern region and the world as a whole – one can only imagine the further impact a successful repeat of this violence will have if visited upon Iran directly.
link to one of the Mojahedin Khalq songs
advocating terror and killing Americans
(In Persian written and distributed after the Iranian Revolution)
Former MEK Official Exposes Saudi Arabia’s Covert Funding of Iranian Terror Group (Mojahedin Khalq, Rajavi cult)
Whitney Webb, Mint Press, September 23 2018:… In an interview with Jordan-based news outlet Albawaba News, former MEK head of security Massoud Khodabandeh detailed the covert means through which the Saudis helped fund the group, including regional smuggling networks and black market transactions. According to Khodabandeh, gold and other valuable commodities, such as Rolex watches, were shipped from Saudi Arabia …
Former MEK Official Exposes Saudi Arabia’s Covert Funding of Iranian Terror Group
According to the Iranian terror group’s former head of security, Saudi intelligence helped fund the group by smuggling valuables like gold and Rolex watches into Iraq and Jordan for sale on the black market.
by Whitney Webb
AMMAN, JORDAN — Though it had been suspected for years, testimony from a former high-ranking official from the Iranian militant opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq (MEK) has confirmed that the group had been covertly financed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For decades, the Gulf Kingdom — known for its general hostility towards Shi’ite Muslims — contributed hundreds of millions of dollars in gold and other valuables to help finance the Iranian Marxist militant group – namely the group’s ultimate goal of instigating violent regime change in Iran and subsequently taking power.
In an interview with Jordan-based news outlet Albawaba News, former MEK head of security Massoud Khodabandeh detailed the covert means through which the Saudis helped fund the group, including regional smuggling networks and black market transactions.
According to Khodabandeh, gold and other valuable commodities, such as Rolex watches, were shipped from Saudi Arabia to Baghdad and then sold on black markets in the Jordanian capital of Amman by Saudi-linked businessmen. The proceeds from those transactions were then placed in offshore accounts tied to the MEK and subsequently used to fund their operations.
Khodabandeh also recounted how the Saudis had even given the group a kiswa – a large drape that adorns the Kaaba shrine in the Islamic holy city of Mecca. Manufactured at a cost of approximately $5 million, kiswas are often worth significantly more than their cost of production given their religious significance.
The former MEK official also told Albawaba that he had personally overseen the transfer of valuables from Saudi Arabia to Baghdad that were then sold in order to fund the group. In one instance, Khodabandeh had smuggled three trucks filled with gold bars from Saudi Arabia to Baghdad along with two Iraqi and two Saudi accomplices. He estimated that the gold contained in the trucks was worth nearly $200 million, all of which eventually found its way into MEK coffers.
Khodabandeh also asserted that Prince Turki bin Faisal al Saud, former head of Saudi intelligence, was intimately involved in the smuggling rings used to covertly fund the MEK. Unsurprisingly, bin Faisal has since become a vocal advocate for the group and has spoken at several of the group’s annual conferences hosted in Paris. At the 2017 MEK conference, bin Faisal stated:
Your efforts to confront this regime are legitimate, and your struggle to rescue all sectors of the Iranian society… from the oppression of the Velayat-e Faqih rule, as was said by Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, is legitimate and an imperative. Therefore, advance with God’s blessing.”
Khodabandeh went onto to state that, while former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had once been the main patron of the MEK, bin Faisal who had taken over as the main backer of the group in recent years, asserting that the group had become an “organization run by Maryam [Rajavi, current MEK leader] under the patronage of Prince Turki bin Faisal al Saud.” The former MEK official concluded the interview by stating that the MEK had “changed from a terrorist military organization to an intelligence-based propaganda machine.”
Past Saudi Funding An Inconvenient Truth for MEK’s “Moderate” Makeover
Despite their past as a militant organization responsible for the mass murder of Iranian and American citizens, the MEK has sought to change their image in recent years and reinvent itself as a “moderate” Iranian opposition group and government-in-exile. These efforts have grown in recent years despite the fact that the group has next to no support within Iran and has consistently been characterized asboth “cultish” and “authoritarian.”
The MEK’s facelift from terror group to propaganda machine began in the 2000s, kicking into high gear after former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had them removed from the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations in 2012. The MEK’s propaganda efforts have since kicked into overdrive under the Trump administration, given that President Trump has sought to place “maximum pressure” on Iran with the ultimate goal of regime change. Currently, the Trump administration is stocked with known MEK supporters, including Rudy Giuliani, John Bolton and Elaine Chao, who have received thousands of dollars from the group over the years.
Despite its record of killing innocent civilians, Western media cited MEK spokespeople and members in its reporting on the Iran protests earlier this year as “proof” that the Iranian people support regime change and the MEK, ignoring the massive pro-government ralliesthat coincided with the protests. Little mention was made of the fact that MEK fighters have been trained by the U.S. military in the past and share connections with Israeli Mossad. The recent revelations of the group’s connections to Saudi Arabia have also unsurprisingly slipped under the media’s radar.
Top Photo | Saudi women look at jewelry at a gold fair in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. (AP/Hassan Ammar)
Whitney Webb is a staff writer for MintPress News and a contributor to Ben Swann’s Truth in Media. Her work has appeared on Global Research, the Ron Paul Institute and 21st Century Wire, among others. She has also made radio and TV appearances on RT and Sputnik. She currently lives with her family in southern Chile.
Mojahedin Khalq (MEK, MKO, NCRI, Rajavi cult) keyboard warriors target journalists, Academics, activists
The Listening Post, Aljazeera, September 16 2018:…”Our orders would tell us the hashtags to use in our tweets in order to make them more active,” says Hassan Shahbaz, another former MEK member. “It was our job to provide coverage of these protests by seeking out, tweeting and re-tweeting videos while adding our own comments.”MEK keyboard warriors would also target journalists, …
Faking the online debate on Iran
How keyboard warriors target journalists, academics and activists who favour dialogue instead of war with Iran.
15 Sep 2018 15:27 GMT
Last month, Google, Facebook and Twitter announced the shutdown of pages and accounts they say were linked to Iran. While the effectiveness of Iran’s online disinformation networks is far from established, the Islamic Republic has now joined Russia in the popular consciousness as another government using the internet to destabilise its adversaries.
Meanwhile, a widespread campaign of social media manipulation by actors who are opposed to the government in Tehran has had many analysts eyeing Iran’s enemies for clues to who might be behind the project.
“The turning point was really [Donald] Trump’s election,” says journalist and New America fellow Azadeh Moaveni. “Once it became clear that there would be heightened hostility with Iran, there was a profusion of new accounts, anonymous accounts who were single-mindedly and purposefully going after people who wrote about, talked about Iran with nuance.”
While Twitter did not respond directly to questions about the methodology it used to detect organised manipulation of its platform, lecturer in Middle East history at Exeter University, Marc Owen Jones, shared with us how he uses freely available Twitter metadata to detect the presence of bots.
“If you want to use bots to be effective you need a lot of accounts, which means you might create a lot of accounts on a specific day or week or month,” explains Jones. “The majority of the accounts tweeting on the #FreeIran and #Iran_Regime_Change hashtag from late December up to May, were created within about a four-month window. What that would suggest is that a lot of the activity on those hashtags came from bots.”
Most of the accounts identified had only a few dozen or a few hundred followers and used generic profile pictures. The vast majority tweet almost exclusively in opposition to the Islamic Republic with many exhibiting sympathies with an exiled Iranian dissident group, the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK).
The MEK was instrumental in Iran’s 1979 revolution but turned to violent attacks on civilian targets after being sidelined by Ayatollah Khomeini. A violent backlash forced the group into Iraqwhere they allied with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war.
In 2013, the MEK moved to Albania at the behest of the United States. The group has long lobbied for policies to overthrow Iran’s government.
The MEK declined our request for an interview citing, “terrorist threats of Iranian regime and mobilising the agents of Iranian Ministry of Intelligence under the guise of journalist”.
However, former MEK members still stranded in the Albanian capital, Tirana, having left the group, described how the MEK uses thousands of fake Twitter accounts to both promote their organisation and to boost online calls for regime change.
“Overall I would say that several thousand accounts are managed by about 1,000-1,500 MEK members,” former MEK member, Hassan Heyrani, told The Listening Post. “It was all very well organised and there were clear instructions about what needed to be done.”
The MEK online unit was especially active during several weeks of protests beginning in December 2017. Members were ordered to emphasise the anti-regime character of the demonstrations.
“Our orders would tell us the hashtags to use in our tweets in order to make them more active,” says Hassan Shahbaz, another former MEK member. “It was our job to provide coverage of these protests by seeking out, tweeting and re-tweeting videos while adding our own comments.”
MEK keyboard warriors would also target journalists, academics and activists who favour dialogue rather than confrontation with Iran.
“Because of my platform, I have received a significant amount of Twitter attacks of this kind, but I am nowhere near being alone,” Trita Parsi, author of, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy, said. “This is actually a very pervasive phenomena, the big victim of this is that we don’t have a rational conversation about policy towards Iran.”
Since access to Iran for journalists is restricted, social media can become a proxy for where the debate is going, leaving open the possibility that both state and non-state actors can use platforms like Twitter to create and manipulate trends in ways that suit their agenda.
“It’s not like what happens on social media stays there any more,” Marc Owen Jones said. “It filters its way into mainstream media. There is so much propaganda, so much fake news that it would take very little to create a wave of what looks like popular Iranian opinion against the government that’s not necessarily real.”
Trita Parsi – Author, Losing an Enemy – Obama, Iran and the Triumph of Diplomacy’
Azadeh Moaveni – Fellow, New America
Marc Owen Jones – Lecturer in Middle East History, Exeter University
Hassan Heyrani – Former MEK member
Hassan Shahbaz – Former MEK member
The Most Dangerous Cult In Albania (Albania for Albanians. Not for Terrorist MEK)
Euro Timers, August 28 2018:… Behzad Saffari from Isfahan went to the UK to study dentistry He was recruited by MEK and sent to Iraq after Rajavi moved there. He was injured in operation Eternal Light (Forough Javidan) in 1988 and brought back to London to recover before being sent back to Iraq. Witnesses allege that Behzad was involved in beatings in MEK prisons. Behzad cheated his family out of …
The Most Dangerous Cult In Albania
Albania for Albanians not for terrorist MEK
Albania for Albanians not for Rajavi Terrorists
Mojahedin Khalq, MEK, Rajavi cult in Iraq No more
اتمام قائله مجاهدین خلق، فرقه رجوی در عراق
The End of the Path – Teaser 1
پایان یک راه – تیزر اول
Mojahedin Khalq, MEK, Rajavi cult in Iraq No more
اتمام قائله مجاهدین خلق، فرقه رجوی در عراق
The End of the Path – Teaser ۲
پایان یک راه – تیزر دوم
Albanian Police No Match For MEK Commanders Trained By Saddam’s Mukhabarat
Massoud Khodabandeh, Iranian.com, August 09 2018:… A family drama playing out in Albania has caught the attention of media and public opinion. But this is no ordinary drama. It is the story of Iranian born Mostafa and Mahboubeh Mohammadi, who are Canadian citizens and their twenty-one-year struggle to rescue their daughter from a dangerous terrorist cult. In 1997, Somayeh and …
Albanian Police No Match For MEK Commanders Trained By Saddam’s Mukhabarat
Afamily drama playing out in Albania has caught the attention of media and public opinion. But this is no ordinary drama. It is the story of Iranian born Mostafa and Mahboubeh Mohammadi, who are Canadian citizens and their twenty-one-year struggle to rescue their daughter from a dangerous terrorist cult.
In 1997, Somayeh and her brother Mohammad, were deceptively recruited into the violent extremist group, Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK). Somayeh was seventeen. They travelled to Iraq for a two week visit to the MEK training camp, and never returned home. Their parents were supporters of MEK and at first simply appealed directly to the group’s leaders for their children’s return to their studies and family. MEK ignored their requests.
It wasn’t until the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003 that Mostafa was able to travel to Iraq independently of MEK and reach out to his children. He managed to rescue Mohammad and bring him back to Canada. But Somayeh was under constant supervision by MEK commanders who used coercive control to confuse and intimidate the girl. She was afraid to leave, even though she had written several times to the US Marines guarding the camp asking for help.
Somayeh and Mohammad Mohammadi in Camp Ashraf Iraq
Her parents made repeated attempts to meet freely with Somayeh, so they could reassure her of her future with them in Canada. MEK closed all doors to them and in doing so, alienated a whole family which had been ardent supporters. Mostafa had even volunteered to take part in the MEK orchestrated self-immolations in 2003 to protest the arrest in Paris of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi. He was only saved when a friend snatched the lighter from his hand after Mostafa had doused himself in petrol. Now, instead of returning Somayeh to Canada and having a family of active supporters for their cause, MEK has destroyed the life of a young woman and broken the hearts of her family.
Mostafa and Mahboubeh Mohammadi interviewed by Albanian media
Somayeh was brought to Albania with another 3,000 MEK after Iraq expelled the terrorist group. From their first arrival in Tirana in 2013, MEK members frightened ordinary citizens with their intimidatory behaviour. Intense and forceful but somehow disengaged, MEK members swept through the capital like a plague. In place of a de-radicalization programme, the Americans in charge of them allowed them to retreat behind the closed walls of a purpose-built terrorist training camp in a rural town, Manez in the district of Durres. In spite of this, over four hundred have managed to escape the group and are willing to endure hardship rather than continue to associate with MEK. One recent escapee described conditions inside MEK as “slavery”.
In this context, Mostafa and Mahboubeh are now in Tirana making another attempt to meet their daughter. This time, without the presence of MEK minders. They have appealed to the Albanian authorities to help them. They refused.
Instead, MEK has been allowed to go berserk, instigating a campaign of propaganda and intimidation that has created a real crisis for the country; for its citizens, its government and its security and law enforcement services.
Albanian media presents this as a family dispute. But there is no equivalence between the ordinary parents from Canada and the people who are surrounding Somayeh. These are people whose background reveals how dangerous they are. So that when the Albanian police are called to an incidence of public disorder, they are not expecting nor are they quipped through training or resources to deal with radicalised violent extremists trained by Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guards, many with blood on their hands. Yet this is what the government has imposed on them. Even the security and intelligence services of Albania are inadequately prepared to deal with the criminal unpredictability and unaccountability of MEK.
The MEK commanders and agents involved in delivering MEK’s version of Somayeh’s story are as follows:
The female commander, Jila Deyhim, was recruited as a student at Manchester University in the UK at the time of Iran’s 1979 Revolution. Her husband Ahmad Shadbakhti was killed in an armed clash with security forces in Tehran. Jila left their daughter in the UK to be raised by her brother Khosro Deyhim (aka Haji) in Newcastle Upon Tyne while she went to join MEK in Iraq.
Jila is the head of MEK Operations in Tirana. As well as being present when two MEK operatives publicly assaulted Mostafa in a street in Tirana, she organised for over 60 MEK to surround Police Station 4 in Tirana while two arrested MEK members were being questioned by police. Afterwards, JIla sent the 60 MEK to spread through the city to hunt down and intimidate and beat up ex-MEK members. (Local police officers, used to dealing with ordinary crimes and criminals, were so shocked by the MEK behaviour that they wrote to the Interior Ministry saying they are not equipped to deal with sixty potential suicide bombers and to ask that the security forces in charge of MEK make sure the police will not have to deal with these ‘guests of the state’ again.)
Historically, Jila served as a commander during the Kurdish massacres – Operation Morvarid (Pearl) in 1991 – as well as many other operations. Witnesses have given further testimony of her torturing and killing disaffected members in MEK/Saddam Hussein prisons in Camp Ashraf. Jila ‘graduated’ as a highly trained intelligence officer under Saddam Hussein’s security service. In addition, she undertook field training, tank driving, basic combat and SWAT command.
Jila Deyhim in Iraq and in Albania
Homayoun Deyhim – in the pink shirt assaulting Mostafa Mohammadi – is a brother of Jila. He studied Electrical Engineering in Newcastle University in the UK just before the Revolution. During the Revolution he went to India to study for an MSC. In India he worked for MEK, but was later recruited by Jila to go to Iraq.
Homayoun never achieved any significant rank, working mostly in the technical and repair departments. But he is famous inside MEK for agreeing to do anything to get promoted. Hence, on many occasions he was involved in punitive beating and humiliating of other members in Camp Ashraf. Homayoun undertook basic military training and Republican Guards operations training.
In Police Station 4 in Tirana after his arrest for assaulting Mostafa, Jila instructed Homayoun to claim that Mostafa had attacked him. They did not know at that time that there was videoed evidence from the scene which shows what actually happened.
Homayoun Deyhim in Iraq and Albania
Behzad Saffari from Isfahan went to the UK to study dentistry He was recruited by MEK and sent to Iraq after Rajavi moved there. He was injured in operation Eternal Light (Forough Javidan) in 1988 and brought back to London to recover before being sent back to Iraq. Witnesses allege that Behzad was involved in beatings in MEK prisons. Behzad cheated his family out of their life savings – which he gave to MEK – by falsely claiming to have left the organisation. His father sent money to family members in Canada, but it ended up in MEK accounts in the UK.
Behzad was involved in liaising with the UNHCR during the transfer process from Iraq to Albania. Former members recount how the UNHCR gave each individual 100 USD for the journey and after their arrival. When the members arrived in Tirana airport, Behzad took the $100 from each one of them and gave them one hundred Albanian LEK as local currency (around one US dollar).
Behzad is currently involved with the teams harassing ex-members and journalists in Tirana. Behzad Saffari is liaising with the MEK lawyer and answers to Jila Deyhim.
Behzad Saffari in Iraq and Albania
Ahmad Taba (aka Akbar), was a student in UMIST (Manchester) at the time of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. He was recruited by MEK to work in London and was then transferred to Iraq after Massoud Rajavi went there.
Ahmad was trained as a helicopter pilot by the Iraqi Army. He graduated from training by Saddam’s Republican Guards, which included guerrilla war and SWAT tactics. He also underwent a 9-month course with Saddam’s Mukhabarat, from which he graduated as an Intelligence officer. He killed many civilians in the Kurdish attacks and there are witnesses connecting him to the torture of prisoners in Camp Ashraf.
Ahmad Taba in Albania and Iraq
Somayeh Mohammadi herself has not left the MEK camps in Iraq or Albania for twenty-one years. She has no idea about what is happening in the outside world. It is incomprehensible that a woman who claims to be freely pursuing a political struggle for violent regime change against Iran is incapable of meeting alone with her parents to tell them face to face of her decision. Her parents, who know her so well, say it is clear she is afraid and not acting freely when she speaks out against them. Surrounded by the above MEK characters, it is clear that she is under control and is unable to speak or act for herself in any meaningful way. This is not a family dispute, Somayeh is a hostage.
Under the pressure of coercive control, experts can easily recognise in Somayeh a victim who, in the hands of MEK, has been forced to the edge of a cliff over which she may be pushed or fall. If it is subsequently reported that she has disappeared, committed suicide, drowned in a reservoir or otherwise come to harm, there can be no doubt that the government of Albania must be held accountable. She cannot save herself from harm, yet the possibility of MEK harming her is very high. She is in great danger.
Albania may be a failed state, but it is not a rogue state like Saddam’s Iraq. It is a state with pretensions to joining the European Union. The government can and should be held accountable for whatever happens to Somayeh Mohammadi. The way to prevent such an outcome is to step in and separate her from her captors.
Një dramë familjare që po shfaqet në Shqipëri ka tërhequr vëmendjen e mediave dhe opinionit publik. Por kjo nuk është një dramë e zakonshme. Është historia e çiftit iranian Mostafa dhe Mahboubeh Mohammadi, të cilët janë qytetarë kanadezë dhe prej njëzet e një vitesh luftojnë për të shpëtuar vajzën e tyre nga një kult i rrezikshëm terrorist.
Në vitin 1997, Somayeh dhe vëllai i saj Mohammad, u rekrutuan në mënyrë mashtruese në grupin e dhunshëm ekstremist, Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK). Somayeh ishte shtatëmbëdhjetë vjeç. Ata udhëtuan për në Irak për një vizitë dyjavore në kampin e trajnimit të MEK-ut dhe kurrë nuk u kthyen në shtëpi. Prindërit e tyre ishin përkrahës të MEK-ut dhe së pari thjesht iu drejtuan drejtuesve të grupit për kthimin e fëmijëve të tyre në familje. MEK i shpërfilli kërkesat e tyre.
Deri në rënien e regjimit të Sadamit në vitin 2003, Mostafa ishte në gjendje të udhëtojë në Irak pavarësisht nga MEK dhe të arrijë tek fëmijët e tij. Ai arriti të shpëtojë Muhammedin dhe ta çonte atë në Kanada. Por Somayeh ishte nën mbikëqyrje të vazhdueshme nga komandantët e MEK që përdorën kontrollin shtrëngues për të ngatërruar dhe frikësuar vajzën. Ajo kishte frikë të largohej, megjithëse kishte shkruar disa herë marinës amerikane që ruanin kampin duke kërkuar ndihmë.
Somayeh dhe Mohammad Mohammadi në Kampin Ashraf, Irak
Prindërit e saj bënin përpjekje të përsëritura për t’u takuar lirshëm me Somayeh dhe për ta rikthyer atë në familjen e tyre në Kanada. MEK i mbylli të gjitha dyert dhe duke vepruar kështu, tjetërsonte një familje të tërë që kishte qenë përkrahës i zjarrtë. Mostafa madje vullnetarisht mori pjesë në MEK-un në vitin 2003 për të protestuar kundër arrestimit në Paris të liderit MEK Maryam Rajavi. Por edhe pas kësaj sakrifice të Mostafa, MEK nuk e ktheu Somayeh në familjen e saj, por e mban mbyllur duke i shkatërruar jetën dhe duke thyer zemrat e familjarëve të saj.
Somayeh u soll në Shqipëri nga MEK pasi Iraku dëboi grupin terrorist. Që nga ardhja e tyre e parë në Tiranë në vitin 2013, anëtarët e MEK-ut i frikësuan qytetarët me sjelljen e tyre intimidatore dhe menjëherë ata u përhapën në qytet si një murtajë .
Në vend të një programi de-radikalizimi, amerikanët përgjegjës për to i lejuan të tërhiqen prapa mureve të mbyllura të një kampi stërvitjeje të ndërtuar në një qytet rural të Durrësit, Manëz. Përkundër kësaj, më shumë se katërqind njerëz kanë arritur të shpëtojnë nga grupi dhe janë të gatshëm të përballojnë vështirësitë në vend që të vazhdojnë të lidhen me MEK. Një i arratisur i kohëve të fundit përshkroi kushtet brenda MEK si “skllavëri”.
Mostafa dhe Mahboubeh janë tani në Tiranë duke bërë një përpjekje tjetër për të takuar vajzën e tyre. Ata u janë lutur autoriteteve shqiptare për t’i ndihmuar. Ata refuzuan.
Në vend të kësaj, MEK-u është lejuar të nxisë një fushatë të propagandës dhe frikësimit që ka krijuar një krizë të vërtetë për vendin, për qytetarët e saj, qeverinë e saj, sigurinë e saj dhe shërbimet e zbatimit të ligjit.
Mediat shqiptare e paraqesin këtë si një mosmarrëveshje familjare . Por nuk ekziston ekuivalenca mes prindërve të zakonshëm nga Kanadaja dhe njerëzve që po rrethojnë Somayeh. Këta janë njerëz, prejardhja e të cilëve zbulon sa të rrezikshëm janë. Kështu që kur policia shqiptare është thirrur në një incident të çrregullimit publik, ata as nuk janë përfshirë në trajnime apo burime për t’u marrë me ekstremistët e dhunshëm të radikalizuar të trajnuar nga rojet republikane të Saddam Husseinit, shumë prej të cilëve me gjak në duart e tyre. Megjithatë, kjo është ajo që qeveria u ka imponuar atyre. Edhe shërbimet e sigurisë dhe të inteligjencës së Shqipërisë nuk janë të përgatitur në mënyrë adekuate për t’u marrë me paparashikueshmërinë dhe mosgndërgjegjshmërinë kriminale të MEK.
Komandantët dhe agjentët e MEK-ut të përfshirë në dorëzimin e versionit të MEK-ut për historinë e Somayeh janë si më poshtë:
Komandantja femër, Jila Deyhim, u rekrutua si studente në Universitetin e Manchesterit në Mbretërinë e Bashkuar në kohën e Revolucionit të Iranit në 1979. Burri i saj Ahmad Shadbakhti u vra në një përleshje të armatosur me forcat e sigurisë në Teheran. Jila la vajzën e tyre në Britani të Madhe për t’u rritur nga vëllai i saj Khosro Deyhim (aka Haji) në Neëcastle Upon Tyne ndërsa ajo shkoi të bashkohej me MEK në Irak.
Jila është kreu i Operacioneve të MEK-ut në Tiranë. Përveç faktit se dy oficerë të MEK-ut e sulmuan publikisht Mostafën në një rrugë në Tiranë, ajo organizoi për më shumë se 60 MEK që rrethonin Stacionin e Policisë 4 në Tiranë, ndërsa dy anëtarë të arrestuar të MEK-ut u pyetën nga policia. Më pas, JIla dërgoi 60 MEK për tu përhapur nëpër qytet për të ndjekur, frikësuar dhe rrahur ish-anëtarët e MEK. (Zyrtarët e policisë lokale, të përdorur për t’u marrë me krimet e zakonshme dhe kriminelët, u tronditën aq shumë nga sjellja e MEK-ut dhe ata i shkruan Ministrisë së Brendshme duke thënë se nuk janë të pajisur për t’u marrë me gjashtëdhjetë vetë sulmues vetëvrasës potencialë”.)
Historikisht, Jila shërbeu si komandante gjatë masakrave kurde, në Operacionin Morvarid (Pearl) në 1991, si dhe shumë operacione të tjera. Dëshmitarët kanë dhënë dëshmi të mëtejshme për torturimin dhe vrasjen e anëtarëve të pakënaqur në burgjet e MEK. Jila ‘u diplomua’ si një oficere e inteligjencës e trajnuar nën shërbimin e sigurisë së Sadam Huseinit. Përveç kësaj, ajo ndërmori trainim në terren, vozitje tank, luftë bazë dhe komandë SWAT.
Jila Deyhim në Irak dhe në Shqipëri
Homayoun Deyhim, që sulmoi Mostafa Mohammadin është vëllai i Jilas. Ai studioi Inxhinieri Elektrike në Universitetin e Neëcastle në Mbretërinë e Bashkuar vetëm para Revolucionit. Gjatë Revolucionit ai shkoi në Indi për të studiuar për një MSC. Në Indi punoi për MEK, por më vonë u rekrutua nga Jila për të shkuar në Irak.
Homayoun kurrë nuk ka arritur ndonjë gradë të rëndësishme, duke punuar kryesisht në departamentet teknike dhe të riparimit. Por ai është i famshëm brenda MEK-ut për të rënë dakord të bëjë diçka për t’u promovuar. Prandaj, në shumë raste ai ishte i përfshirë në rrahjen dhe poshtërimin e anëtarëve të tjerë në Kampin Ashraf. Homayoun ndërmori trajnimin bazë ushtarak dhe trajnimin e operacioneve të rojave republikane.
Në Stacionin Policor 4 në Tiranë, pas arrestimit të tij për sulm ndaj Mostafës, Jila e udhëzoi Homayoun të pohonte se Mostafa e kishte sulmuar atë. Ata nuk e dinin në atë kohë se kishte prova video nga skena që tregon se çfarë ndodhi në të vërtetë.
Homayoun Deyhim në Irak dhe Shqipëri
Behzad Saffari nga Isfahan shkoi në Mbretërinë e Bashkuar për të studiuar stomatologji. Ai u rekrutua nga MEK dhe u dërgua në Irak pasi Rajavi u transferua atje. Ai u plagos në operacion Dritën e Përjetshme (Forough Javidan) në vitin 1988 dhe u kthye në Londër për t’u rimarr para se të kthehej në Irak. Dëshmitarët pohojnë se Behzad ishte i përfshirë në rrahje në burgjet e MEK. Behzad mashtroi familjen e tij nga kursimet e tyre të jetës, të cilën ai i dha MEK duke pretenduar në mënyrë të rreme që të kishte lënë organizatën. Babai i tij i dërgoi paratë anëtarëve të familjes në Kanada, por ajo përfundoi në llogaritë e MEK në Britani të Madhe.
Behzad ishte i përfshirë në kontakt me UNHCR-në gjatë procesit të transferimit nga Iraku në Shqipëri. Anëtarët e mëparshëm tregojnë se si UNHCR-ja i dha çdo individi 100 dollarë për udhëtimin dhe pas mbërritjes së tyre. Kur anëtarët arritën në aeroportin e Tiranës, Behzad mori 100 $ nga secili prej tyre dhe u dha atyre njëqind Lek Shqiptar si monedhë vendase (rreth një dollar amerikan).
Behzad aktualisht është i përfshirë me ekipet që kërcënojnë ish-anëtarë dhe gazetarë në Tiranë. Behzad Saffari po bashkëpunon me avokatin e MEK dhe përgjigjet ndaj Jila Deyhim.
Behzad Saffari në Irak dhe Shqipëri
Ahmad Taba (aka Akbar), ishte student në UMIST (Manchester) në kohën e Revolucionit iranian në 1979. Ai u rekrutua nga MEK për të punuar në Londër dhe më pas u transferua në Irak, pasi Massoud Rajavi shkoi atje.
Ahmedi u trajnua si një pilot helikopteri nga Ushtria Irakiane. Ai u diplomua nga rojet republikane të Sadamit, ku përfshiheshin luftërat guerile dhe taktikat SWAT. Ai gjithashtu pbëri një kurs 9-mujor me Mukhabaratin e Sadamit, nga i cili u diplomua si oficer i inteligjencës. Ai vrau shumë civilë në sulmet kurde dhe ka dëshmitarë që e lidhin atë me torturimin e të burgosurve në Kampin Ashraf.
Ahmed Taba në Shqipëri dhe Irak
Somayeh Mohammadi vetë nuk ka lënë kampet e MEK në Irak apo Shqipëri për njëzet e një vjet. Ajo nuk ka asnjë ide se çfarë po ndodh në botën e jashtme. Është e pakuptueshme që një grua që pretendon se po ndjek lirisht një luftë politike për ndryshimin e dhunshëm të regjimit kundër Iranit, është e paaftë të takohet me prindërit e saj për t’iu treguar ballë për ballë vendimin e saj. Prindërit e saj, të cilët e njohin atë aq mirë, thonë se është e qartë se ajo ka frikë dhe nuk vepron lirshëm kur flet kundër tyre. I rrethuar nga personazhet e MEK-ut të mësipërm, është e qartë se ajo është nën kontroll dhe nuk është në gjendje të flasë ose të veprojë për vete në ndonjë mënyrë kuptimplotë. Kjo nuk është një mosmarrëveshje familjare, Somayeh është një peng.
Nën presionin e kontrollit shtrëngues, ekspertët lehtë mund të njohin në Somayeh një viktimë e cila, në duart e MEK, është detyruar në buzë të një shkëmbi mbi të cilin mund të shtyhet ose të bjerë. Nëse më vonë raportohet se ajo është zhdukur, ka kryer vetëvrasje, është mbytur në një rezervuar, nuk ka dyshim se qeveria shqiptare duhet të mbajë përgjegjësi. Ajo nuk mund të shpëtojë veten nga dëmtimi, por mundësia e dëmtimit të MEK-ut është shumë e lartë. Ajo është në rrezik të madh.
Shqipëria mund të jetë një shtet i dështuar, por nuk është një shtet bandit si Iraku i Sadamit. Është një shtet me pretendime për t’u bashkuar me Bashkimin Evropian. Qeveria mundet dhe duhet të mbajë përgjegjësi për çfarëdo që ndodh me Somayeh Mohammadi. Mënyra për të parandaluar një rezultat të tillë është ndarja e saj nga MEK.
Burimi: The Iranian/ Gazeta impakt
PARALAJMËRIMI NGA IRANI: POLICIA SHQIPTARE E PAAFTË, MUXHAHEDINËT TË TRAJNUAR NGA GARDA E SADDAMIT
Publikuar tek: AKTUALITET, më 20:11 08-08-2018
Prej disa ditësh në mediat shqiptare qarkullon historia e një gruaje muxhahedine me banim në Shqipëri, e cila refuzon të bashkohet me prindërit e mbërritur nga Kanadaja në Tiranë.
Somayeh i quan prindërit e saj “agjentë iranianë”, ndërsa i ka bërë disa herë thirrje publike shtetit shqiptar t’i vijë në ndihmë.
Nga ana tjetër, prindërit Mostafa dhe Mahboubeh Mohammadi thonë se vajza e tyre është pjesë e një kulti të rrezikshëm terroristësh, MEK apo Mojahedin-e Khalq.
Faqja “online” iranian.com tregon versionin tjetër të historisë dhe ngre alarmin për rrezikshmërinë që paraqesin muxhahedinët që strehohen në Shqipëri.
“Iranian” identifikon disa prej muxhahedinëve për të cilët thotë se janë trajnuar nga Garda e diktatorit Saddam Hussein me taktika lufte të avancuara. Në artikull thuhet se ata dhunojnë dhe intimidojnë muxhahedinët që braktisin kampin në Shqipëri.
“Në rast mosbindje apo revlotë”, policia shqiptare por edhe shërbimet inteligjente shqiptare “janë të paafta përballë këtij rreziku të madh që i kanoset”, shkruhen ndër të tjera në artikull.
Albania: MEK rebrands by assassinating unwanted members
Massoud and Anne Khodabandeh, Balkans Post, June 22 2018:… The mysterious disappearance of a member of the Mojahedin Khalq (MEK) terrorist group in Albania has once again drawn attention to this controversial group. Malek Sharaee, 47, originally from Khuzestan Province in Iran, was reportedly drowned in the Rrotull village irrigation water reservoir. After three days, divers have not found his body even though the …
Albania: MEK rebrands by assassinating unwanted members
Massoud Keshmiri: Killed Iran’s PM and President – last seen in Germany after escaping MEK
The mysterious disappearance of a member of the Mojahedin Khalq (MEK) terrorist group in Albania has once again drawn attention to this controversial group. Malek Sharaee, 47, originally from Khuzestan Province in Iran, was reportedly drowned in the Rrotull village irrigation water reservoir. After three days, divers have not found his body even though the water channel is only 3.5 meters deep. However, a MEK representative and three MEK witnesses say his clothes were found at the water’s edge. Police are now investigating this as a possible criminal offense. Even so, unless they gain access to Camp Ashraf Three, the MEK’s purpose-built training camp in Manez, they are unlikely to unearth the truth – MEK impunity is far greater than this small country can deal with or penetrate.
MEK (aka Saddam’s Private Army) was unknown in Albania until they arrived after 2013. Their bizarre behavior and controversial activitiessoon became the focus of media attention.
But the MEK’s dark history began long before this. Along with well-publicised military-style terrorist attacks on Iran since the 1980s, the MEK was also trained by Saddam Hussein’s Mukhaberat (Secret Services) and later by Israel’s MOSSAD, in intelligence gathering and secret operations. As a result, MEK has also conducted many covert terror acts and assassinations over the years. Several of these were deliberately staged to make it look like Iran was involved. Such as the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. In spite of extensive investigation, the primary evidence linking Iran came from four high ranking intelligence officers from MEK. In 2011, a man connected to Mexican drug dealers was arrested for the attempted murder of the Saudi Ambassadorto America. The US quickly accused Iran, but after two weeks the perpetrator was linked to MEK. In 2013, Israel arrested a Swedish Iranian man, Ali Mansouri, who ‘confessed’ to be spying for Iran in Tel Aviv. He turned out to be a MEK member.
The underlying pattern behind these events is of deception and callous, cynical murder. These examples are not unique. MEK has a long history of highly sophisticated and brutal undercover activity. However, the reported death of Malek Sharaee in Albania this week also points to a new phase in MEK covert activity. This time individual MEK members who were previously involved in known acts of violence are now themselves becoming victims of their own organization.
Internal assassinations are not new – Commander Ali Zarkesh was deliberately killedduring a military operation in 1988 because he had become critical of the leadership. There have been hundreds of reports of suspicious deaths and actual murders over the last three decades committed against critics and rivals.
In 2013, former MEK member Massoud Dalili was identified as the 53rd victim of a massacre at Camp Ashraf in Iraq. MEK only acknowledged his death when the Iraqi authorities formally identified him via his DNA. Dalili’s body had been deliberately disfigured (his face and hands burned) to hide his identity. Massoud Dalili had been one of the personal security personnel for leader Massoud Rajavi. He had undergone training with Saddam’s Republican Guards and the MEK’s own specialist training. Before coming to Iraq, Dalili had headed a small MEK team in Gilan Province where he was responsible for scores of deaths, including civilians.
Massoud Dalili: Wanted for terrorism in Gilan Province – killed in Camp Ashraf, Iraq
Another victim killed during the same attack was Zohreh Ghaemi, She had commanded the assassination of General Sayad Shirazi in 1999. Of the other victims that day, at least ten are known to have participated in known acts of violence for MEK. No one claimed responsibility for the attack on Camp Ashraf.
In 2015, in the Netherlands, Mohamad Reza Kolahi was killed by a criminal gang on the order of MEK. Investigators confirmed that Kolahi was responsible for the 1981 bombing of the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party in Tehran in which 72 high-ranking politicians and party members were killed.
Another MEK member, Massoud Keshmiri, responsible for the bombing which killed PM Bahonar and President Rajai in 1981, was last seen with MEK in Germany some years ago. He has since vanished and could be dead. Although these deaths cannot be said to be directly linked, there is a common thread whose purpose becomes clear when we remember 2016 when Prince Turki al-Faisal, former Saudi Intelligence chief, announced the death of MEK leader Massoud Rajavi. It is clear from this that MEK is being purged from top to bottom of all the individuals who have had involvement or are associated with its violent past – rebranding by assassination to make the group legally acceptable.